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The information revolution in military affairs (IRMA) has changed the way 
that wars are fought and won. Exploiting the revolution’s core principles enables 
a net-centric, informationalized force to outmaneuver and defeat its adversaries. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) represent a critical advancement in intelligence 
collection capability, but are they as revolutionary a technology as one might 
expect? Is UAV acquisition without IRMA exploitation the equivalent of 
purchasing surface-to-air missiles without their radars? 
This thesis argues that IRMA exploitation is a necessary precondition for 
effective UAV employment, especially in the maritime domain. By examining the 
maritime UAV use of several countries across the IRMA exploitation spectrum, 
one can see that UAV deployment without an underlying information architecture 
undermines the utility of an unmanned asset. 
Southeast Asia is the world’s fastest growing UAV market. While analysts 
have predicted that UAVs will disrupt the regional balance of power, this analysis 
finds that due to a lack of IRMA exploitation, the chances of disruption are 
extremely remote. This thesis identifies the IRMA-related deficiencies of future 
UAV users, and provides recommendations for increasing the chance of effective 
UAV use and ultimately, combat efficiency. 
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Much ink has been spilled in the security world over the drone’s rise to 
prominence. Many experts believe that the drone, or unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV), represents one of the most significant technological developments in 
recent military history. Although sophisticated, remotely-piloted UAVs are 
significantly less costly to acquire and operate than traditional manned airborne 
reconnaissance programs. For this reason, among others, many countries are 
turning to unmanned platforms for everything from intelligence collection to 
kinetic strikes. Simply operating an unmanned platform, however, is not a 
guarantee of its effectiveness for military or political use. Effectiveness is “the 
degree to which something is successful in producing a desired result.”1 Little 
attention has been paid to what makes UAV platforms effective assets beyond 
the tactical level of war. 
If gaining an asymmetric advantage over an adversary were as simple as 
the mere acquisition and deployment of unmanned platforms, many countries 
would be on the verge of upending the status quo of regional hegemony. 
Southeast Asia, for example, stands at the precipice of widespread UAV 
adoption. Will the plethora of new platforms set to fly over Southeast Asia be 
worth their considerable investment, especially if the unmanned systems are 
limited by a country’s information technology, doctrine, organization, or authority? 
It is distinctly possible that acquiring UAV systems without exploiting the 
information revolution in military affairs (IRMA) is the equivalent of purchasing 
surface-to-air missiles without their radar systems. The missiles may fire, but the 
chances of hitting their intended targets would be marginal. 
Many countries are acquiring or developing drones for a variety of uses. 
UAVs could help countries gain vital intelligence critical to policy-making. In one 
                                            
1 Oxford Dictionary, s.v. “Effectiveness,” Accessed August 22, 2016, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/effectiveness. 
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example, maritime disputes in the South China Sea increase the possibility of 
conflict between states. China’s exploitation of IRMA gives it a significant 
advantage over other countries in maritime domain awareness, enabling it to 
exert its considerable force when and where it needs to be applied. UAVs can 
possibly provide a cheap solution to an intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) overmatch through the provision of full motion video (FMV) 
evidence of incidents at sea in disputed areas, deterring hostile maneuvers by 
belligerents in maritime disputes, and enabling smaller powers to maneuver 
tactical assets more rapidly. The advantages of unmanned systems are enabled, 
or constrained, by the IRMA and a country’s ability to exploit it. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Unmanned aerial vehicles represent a critical advancement in intelligence 
collection capability, particularly for countries lacking an airborne reconnaissance 
program. The capability does not, however, exist in a vacuum. UAVs are part of a 
larger information environment within the country’s national security apparatus. 
Advances in information collection and processing contributed to what has been 
called an information revolution in military affairs.2 Although UAVs are capable 
assets in the information domain, deploying UAVs does not constitute 
exploitation of the IRMA. What this thesis seeks to determine is whether effective 
UAV use and IRMA exploitation are symbiotic rather than simply complementary. 
This thesis asks two key questions. First, is IRMA exploitation necessary for 
effective UAV employment? Once one can ascertain whether IRMA is essential 
for effective UAV use, one can assess whether a country is likely to field its 
unmanned capabilities in an effectual way. Second, with Asia’s unique security 
challenges and status as an emerging UAV market, which Southeast Asian 
countries are likely to be able to use their UAVs effectively to conduct ISR 
missions in the maritime domain? 
                                            
2 Richard A. Bitzinger, “Come the Revolution: Transforming the Asia-Pacific’s Militaries,” 
Naval War College Review 48, no. 4 (Autumn, 2005): 40–41. 
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Until recently, establishment of an advanced ISR program for developing 
countries was prohibitively expensive. Airborne reconnaissance, in particular, 
requires considerable investment in personnel, matériel, and training to receive 
actionable intelligence. As technology improves, specifically for unmanned 
platforms and sensors, barriers to entry for countries seeking airborne 
reconnaissance capabilities are reduced. Reconnaissance in the maritime 
domain is a notoriously difficult problem set. It is also the environment that can 
benefit the most from UAV use. Unmanned systems enable countries lacking 
maritime domain awareness to receive and process near real-time intelligence on 
targets that otherwise could not be surveilled. UAVs provide information that 
does not require extensive analysis to inform policymakers. Obtaining FMV or 
static imagery intelligence (IMINT) requires little ancillary information to be 
understood by people unfamiliar with the intelligence trade. By comparison, 
signals intelligence (SIGINT), measures and signatures intelligence (MASINT), 
and human intelligence (HUMINT) require extensive training by analysts to vet 
information that may still prove to be fragmentary at best. UAVs offer immediate, 
digestible information that is difficult to refute for policy use. What was once a 
significant advantage for military powers like the United States and China is now 
available to developing countries for a fraction of the price. 
As described by Benbow in this thesis’ literature review, a country is 
considered to have exploited the IRMA if it has networked sensors, 
informationalized command and control (C2), and a precision strike capability. 
Additionally, a country that has exploited IRMA will have near-complete 
situational awareness and will predict the implications of its command decisions 
with relative accuracy. How countries use their UAV platforms within an IRMA-
enabled information architecture may help explain the relationship between 
UAVs and information advantage. Lack of access to timely information due to 
poor IRMA exploitation may be a key factor in explaining why developing 
countries that purchase UAVs do not see substantive improvements in their 
 4
forces’ capabilities. This research seeks to better understand the value of 
establishing a UAV program, how it could be effectively used to develop 
actionable intelligence, and how such intelligence could be used to advantage in 
the pursuit of a political end. 
The dramatic pace at which information can now be obtained, analyzed, 
and delivered to policymakers elevates the potential importance of IRMA 
exploitation for countries that are undergoing military modernization. Most case 
studies in IRMA are limited to countries with strong technical intelligence 
capabilities and vast command, control, communication, computer, and 
intelligence (C4I) infrastructure. Advanced use of unmanned systems within a 
larger C4I infrastructure requires exploitation of the IRMA. These advanced 
cases can be used as models for comparison against UAV-using countries that 
have not exploited the IRMA. Deployment of unmanned resources without 
exploiting IRMA limits the effectiveness of the platforms and negates the 
potential asymmetric value of the asset. Limited research exists regarding the 
current or potential exploitation of IRMA in Southeast Asia, despite the region’s 
considerable growth as a UAV market. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Though the concept of an information revolution in military affairs and the 
proliferation of UAVs in Southeast Asia are relatively new topics, there is a 
growing amount of literature that addresses relevant aspects of each. There are 
emerging bodies of work that focus separately on the proliferation of drones and 
on the exploitation of IRMA. There has been, however, only limited study of the 
relationship between UAVs and IRMA exploitation. Even in emerging drone 
markets like Southeast Asia, little attention has been paid to the larger 
architecture that supports and enables UAV systems. Many experts recognize 
the increased rate of UAV acquisition in Southeast Asia but focus on UAVs as a 
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subset of larger trends in military modernization.3 The most extensive bodies of 
work relevant to this thesis pertain to the study of revolutions in military affairs 
and the relationship between information and military effectiveness. Defining the 
concepts themselves and understanding how they interact with one another is 
critical to analysis of UAV effectiveness. Reviewing additional literature related to 
trends in Southeast Asian security and the limited scholarship on proliferation of 
unmanned aerial vehicles in Asia will inform discussion related to UAV 
effectiveness in the region. 
1. Revolutions in Military Affairs 
There is a substantial body of literature concerned with defining 
revolutions in military affairs (RMA). Richard Hundley’s research on RMA for the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) succinctly describes 
RMA as “a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which 
either renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of a 
dominant player, creates one or more new core competencies, in some new 
dimension of warfare, or both.”4 Hundley’s research on RMA is particularly 
helpful in laying out what he views as the definitive and alternative characteristics 
of RMA.5 Among the numerous characteristics identified, principal among them is 
the sudden obsolescence of an enemy’s core competencies and/or the creation 
of new dimensions of warfare.6 
                                            
3 Desmond Ball, Richard Bitzinger, Amitav Acharya and others briefly discuss UAVs in their 
larger debate on the existence of an arms race in Southeast Asia. For the most comprehensive 
resource, see: Desmond Ball and Australian National University, Security Trends in the Asia-
Pacific Region: An Emerging Complex Arms Race (Canberra: Australian National University 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2003). 
4 Richard O. Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations: What Can the History of 
Military Revolutions in Military Affairs Tell Us About Transforming the U.S. Military? (Santa 
Monica, CA: Rand, 1999), xiii. 
5 Richard Hundley cites the extensive body of work dedicated to defining RMA and notes that 
it does not help one describe what constitutes an RMA. See: Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future 
Transformations, 8.  
6 Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations, xiii–xiv.  
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a. History of RMA 
Revolution in military affairs, formerly referred to as military revolution, 
was first used in academic circles in 1955 as a way to describe landmark 
changes in the conduct of warfare.7 RMA began to be used heavily in military 
circles at the peak of the Cold War, especially as the Soviet Union started to 
devote considerable attention to the study of RMA.8 Despite diverging scholarly 
opinions on nearly every RMA, there are a few commonly accepted historical 
RMA that exemplify the concept. Napoleon’s military reforms and the 
simultaneous development of nuclear weapons with ballistic missile delivery 
systems demonstrate the transformative nature of RMA both in military conflict 
and in statecraft. 
(1) The Napoleonic RMA 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s concept and implementation of grande guerre from 
1792–1815 is almost universally considered to exemplify RMA.9 There are 
certainly antecedents to Napoleon’s way of war, but scholars widely credit 
Napoleon himself with the changes that resulted in the RMA.10 Napoleon’s RMA 
was less about embracing technological innovation and more about realizing the 
benefits of political and societal nationalism, proof that RMA does not have to 
result explicitly from technological development. France’s levée en masse 
mobilization following the French Revolution provided Napoleon substantial 
resources for war.11 According to Tim Benbow’s analysis of the Napoleonic RMA, 
“the introduction of promotion by merit as the norm brought a new stream of 
                                            
7 Williamson Murray, “Thinking About Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 
no. 16 (Summer, 1997), https://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA354177. 
8 Tim Benbow, Magic Bullet: Understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs (London, 
Brassey’s, 2004): 13. 
9 Colin S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and The Evidence of 
History (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 140–141. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Benbow, Magic Bullet, 25. 
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talent into the officer corps. The result was new organisation and doctrine, which 
permitted tactical and operational approaches that were considerably more 
offensive.”12 Napoleon’s skill in executing military strategy manifested into the 
Grande Armée that reached its peak efficiency between 1805–1806.13 Colin 
Gray notes that “Napoleon enjoyed untrammelled, centralised, political and 
military command over a unified national army.”14 The reintroduction of total war 
to Europe via Napoleon’s novel tactics fundamentally and irrevocably changed 
Europe’s way of war. The eminent military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz noted 
in On War that “not until statesmen had at least perceived the nature of the 
forces that had emerged in France, and had grasped that new political conditions 
now obtained in Europe, could they foresee the broad effect all this would have 
on war.”15 The Napoleonic RMA highlights the importance of the relationship 
between socio-political and military dimensions of national power. Furthermore, it 
elucidates that the innovative use of new technology, rather than the technology 
itself, can be revolutionary. 
(2) The Nuclear RMA 
The nuclear RMA differs from many others in that with the exception of the 
detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II, this revolution has 
not been tested in combat. The nuclear RMA’s history began in Japan, but its 
realization took place between 1948 and 1955 when the United States exploited 
the nuclear RMA in the creation of nuclear-armed long-range strike forces.16 The 
strategic nature of the RMA, however, does not require mushroom clouds to 
irrevocably alter the conduct of warfare and statecraft. Despite its genesis  
having been through technological means, nuclear RMA is fundamentally about 
                                            
12 Benbow, Magic Bullet, 26. 
13 Gray, Strategy for Chaos, 152. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976), 209. 
16 Gray, Strategy for Chaos, 230. 
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the strategic implications of using force. The nuclear RMA did not come about 
simply through the invention of the atomic bomb. Rather, it resulted from a 
combination of technologies, including ICBMs.17 The deterrent effect of a 
credible nuclear weapons delivery solution elevates the importance of diplomacy 
and other forms of statecraft. By assuring that a nuclear war would be a total 
one, even great powers were forced to give pause to war planning and consider 
the potential costs of miscalculation and over-aggression. 
The nuclear RMA also aptly demonstrates, similar to the information 
RMA, that transnational technological advancements can be exploited by a host 
of international actors. Several countries, ranging from great powers like the 
Soviet Union to small countries like North Korea, exploited the nuclear RMA. 
Disputes between India and Pakistan or Israel and Iran exemplify how even 
technologically sophisticated RMA can be exploited by countries of all sizes. 
b. The Role of Technology 
Scholars agree that technology alone is an inadequate determinant of 
RMA. Steven Metz and James Kievit discuss RMA as “arising from simultaneous 
or mutually supportive change in technology, systems, operational methods, and 
military organizations.”18 Though most often RMA are initiated by advancements 
in technology, revolution only occurs when organizations choose to evolve with 
them.19 Countries seeking to exploit revolutions in military affairs must, according 
to the consulted literature, make fundamental changes in the way they use 
innovative technology. Richard Bitzinger substantiates this concept, stating that 
RMA “is more than simply overlaying new technologies and new hardware on 
existing force structures; it requires fundamental changes in military doctrine, 
                                            
17 Benbow, Magic Bullet, 48. 
18 Steven Metz and James Kievit, Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From 
Theory to Policy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=236, 9–11.  
19 Benbow, Magic Bullet, 22. 
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operations, and organization.”20 In order to truly exploit an RMA, the relevant 
literature holds that countries cannot rely solely on the adoption of innovative 
technology like UAVs.  
Usually, a revolution in military affairs occurs at the nexus of technology 
and doctrine. Innovative technologies rarely change the nature of conflict and war 
by themselves, though they often serve as a catalyst. Technology-driven RMA 
often reflect the confluence of a series of technological advances and are 
frequently fully exploited by actors that were not involved in the technology’s 
development.21 To use the UAV example, translating information to intelligence 
requires the combination of a number of technologies including reconnaissance 
sensors, long-dwell airframes, remote control, data relay, and image or signal 
analysis software. Beyond the technology, the revolutionary effects of being able 
to remotely sense information and deliver intelligence in real time to policymakers 
are made possible through extensive training, well-conceived doctrine, and 
efficient organization. Hundley’s research yields that, “all successful technology-
driven RMAs appear to have three components: technology, doctrine, and 
organization.”22 Analysis of a country’s progress in synthesizing the three 
components can aid in the prediction of its success or failure of IRMA 
exploitation. 
2. The Information Revolution in Military Affairs 
The information revolution in military affairs is the latest RMA being 
considered and debated in military research. Literature pertaining to the IRMA 
focuses on whether the IRMA is truly revolutionary, with strong proponents and 
opponents on each side.  
                                            
20 Bitzinger, “Come the Revolution,” 39. 
21 Hundley, Past Revolutions, 13–14. 
22 Ibid., 15. 
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a. What is the IRMA? 
According to Benbow, there are three elements that make up the IRMA: 
sensors, command and control, and precision strike.23 The IRMA allows a 
commander to have “near-complete situational awareness; and, at the limit, to 
allow accurate predictions of the implications of decision.”24 
The processing, analysis, and conversion of information to actionable 
intelligence is key to understanding the IRMA concept. Proponents of the 
concept argue that IRMA is truly revolutionary because it shifts the focus of 
warfare from the means of force used to the results of the force itself. John 
Arquilla and David Ronfeldt suggest that IRMA embodies a Sun Tzu-style 
philosophy: that a country could defeat a belligerent adversary not by destroying 
its forces, but by disrupting its ability to understand the dynamics of the battlefield 
and communicate.25 
Opponents of the IRMA theory contend that despite advances in 
technology, the use of information and intelligence is not a new concept. Using 
historical case studies, eight prominent scholars writing in Information and 
Revolutions in Military Affairs demonstrate that information was used to 
advantage in major battles predating the development of modern IRMA theory.26 
While there is some truth to the argument that the data being shared today does 
not differ substantially from that of World War II, proponents of IRMA would 
argue that the speed and manner in which the information is used, and the 
organizational changes that it necessitated are indicative of a RMA.  
                                            
23 Benbow, Magic Bullet, 80. 
24 Norman C. Davis, “An Information-Based Revolution in Military Affairs,” Strategic Review 
24 no. 1 (Winter, 1996): 83. 
25 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strategy 12, no. 2 
(Spring, 1993): 45. 
26  Emily O. Goldman, ed., Information and Revolutions in Military Affairs (New York: 
Routledge, 2005). 
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The information revolution in military affairs came about through increases 
in technological capability pertaining to data processing, communications, and 
information technology (IT). Countries that exploit the IRMA are more efficient 
and can make decisions that are not completely shrouded in the fog of war.  
It is important to differentiate between popular understandings of 
information, information technology, and information resources. Emily O. 
Goldman’s research into the IRMA clearly defines each term for better 
understanding. The terms in Table 1 are broken up into an inexhaustive list of 
examples for each concept. 
Table 1.   IRMA Terms.27 
Information Information Resource Information Technology 
Data Analyst Satellite 
Words Body of Knowledge Computer 
Numbers Intelligence Agencies Cloud Services 
Images Models / Doctrine Cell Phones 
 
Goldman notes that information technologies and information resources 
are often confounded.28 The IRMA is certainly enabled by technological 
advances in data processing, by access to intelligence, and by improvements in 
C2 capability; but the IRMA also encompasses the conceptual aspects of 
information resources like models and doctrine.29 Only when a country’s 
information resources and information technology move in concert, can it claim 
exploitation of the IRMA. 
                                            
27 Adapted from Goldman, Information and Revolutions in Military Affairs, 2. 
28 Emily O. Goldman, “Introduction: Information Resources and Military Performance,” in  




b. IRMA Exploitation 
The IRMA exists conceptually regardless of whether a country chooses to 
incorporate the IRMA’s advantages into its armed forces. IRMA exploitation 
refers to the realization of key components of the information revolution in military 
affairs. A country can exploit the revolution by demonstrating proficiency in 
networked sensors, informationalized C2, precision strike, near-complete 
situational awareness, and accurately predictive decision-making. The 
components of IRMA are inter-related, requiring proficiency in one or more to 
exploit the rest. A country cannot have near-complete situational awareness 
without a network of sensors. Accurate predictive decisions cannot be made 
without an informationalized command structure or precisely employed weapons. 
Proficiency in one aspect of IRMA will not necessarily lead to a simultaneous 
exploitation of the other components. 
c. IRMA Diffusion 
The existence of IRMA, and its recognition as a revolutionary military 
concept, was not immediately apparent to global forces. Real-world 
demonstration of IRMA’s value by countries like the United States led to the 
gradual adoption of IRMA-related technologies and doctrine. How the IRMA 
diffuses from the original exploiting country to the rest of the world is contingent 
on a number of factors. Emily Goldman’s analysis of IRMA diffusion in Asia offers 
discrete categories that she believes have the biggest impact on future IRMA 
exploitation. Goldman finds that a country is most affected by their relationship to 
the United States, motivations to adopt innovation, and factors that affect their 
capacity to integrate RMA-related innovation.30  
                                            
30 Emily O. Goldman, “Introduction: Military Diffusion and Transformation,” in The Information 
Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia, ed. Emily O. Goldman and Thomas G. Mahnken (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2004): 4. 
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Goldman uses a methodology she calls diffusion diagnostics to analyze 
key components of the RMA exploitation process.31 This model looks at a 
country’s motives for seeking RMA exploitation and settles on “four types of 
explanations: security; political economy; technology; and institutional.”32 Next, 
and most relevant to analysis of Southeast Asian IRMA exploitation, Goldman’s 
model examines four factors that enable or constrain adoption of new 
innovations. 
(1) Polity 
Polity refers to the political environment in a country and the range of 
variables that may encourage or discourage IRMA exploitation. Enabling and 
constraining characteristics of different political factors are given in Table 2. 
Table 2.   Political Factors Affecting Diffusion and Innovation.33 




Diverse interests in dominant 
coalition; controversy in 
military organization 
Diffuse, weak 
Consensus in dominant 
coalition; consensus in military 
organization 
Legal and regulatory 
framework 
Protection of intellectual 
property rights 
Constitutional and legal 
prohibitions on military activity 
Security focus of armed forces External security focus drives 
quest for competitiveness and 
superiority 
Internal security focus diverts 
best troops and resources to 
prop up regime 
Civil-Military Relations Professional autonomous 
military 
Politicized military with civilian 
intervention 
 
                                            
31 Ibid. 
32 Goldman, “Military Diffusion and Transformation.” 
33 Source: Adapted from Goldman,” Military Diffusion and Transformation,” 9. 
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(2) Economy 
In order to obtain or develop new technologies to incorporate into a novel 
doctrine, a country has to demonstrate that it has the physical and human capital 
to make such an investment. Goldman asserts that there are three kinds of 
economic variables that either enable or constrain IRMA exploitation: “economic 
growth; industrial and technological capabilities; and defense spending.”34 See 
Table 3 for a list of economic factors and their effects on a country’s potential 
IRMA exploitation. 
Table 3.   Economic Factors Affecting Diffusion and Innovation.35 
Factor Enabler Constraint 
Economic growth 
Defense spending 




Integration with global 
economy; indigenous R&D; 
strong information industry 
Weak 
Low 
Norm of self-reliance; 
dependence upon imports 
and reverse engineering; 
weak information industry 
Sectoral interconnectedness Horizontal integration of 
defense and commercial 
sectors; free flow of 
information 











High export controls on 
receiving state 
 
(3) Society and Culture 
Exploiting an existing RMA is not as simple as reverse engineering the 
technology and imitating the doctrine. Especially in the fast-changing state of 
IRMA, a country must learn to innovate in ways that make sense for its own 
security needs. Southeast Asia in particular is rich in socio-cultural values and 
                                            
34 Goldman, “Military Diffusion and Transformation,” 9. 
35 Source: Adapted from Goldman, “Military Diffusion and Transformation,” 11. 
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norms that may not be easy to change, should full exploitation of the IRMA 
require it. Education levels and social familiarity with technology can certainly 
affect the diffusion of the IRMA in a country.36 Goldman presented a range of 
factors that can affect adoption in an IRMA seeking country (see Table 4). 
Table 4.   Social and Cultural Factors Affecting Diffusion and Innovation.37 
Factor Enabler Constraint 
Social structure Unified social structure or unifying 
ideology 
High levels of internal social 
conflict 
Human capital High level of technical education 
and literacy; societal familiarity 
with, and use of, computers 
Low level of technical 
education and literacy; low 
societal familiarity with, and 
use of computers 
Organizational Set Strong Weak 
Cultural resonance Strong resonance eases 
transmission and enhances desire 
for adoption 
Weak resonance inhibits 
transmission and diminishes 
desire for adoption 
Cultural tolerance Tolerance of diversity and internal 
debate facilitates innovation and 
diffusion 
Official orthodoxy hinders 
innovation and diffusion 
National culture Participatory 
Short power distance 




Long power distance 




(4) Military Organizations 
Goldman asserts in her research that military organizations are 
categorized in three ways: “natural systems, rational systems, and open 
systems.”38 Natural systems, according to Goldman tend to be risk averse and 
                                            
36 Goldman, “Military Diffusion and Transformation,” 13. 
37 Source: Adapted from Goldman, “Military Diffusion and Transformation,” 14. 
38 Goldman, “Military Diffusion and Transformation,” 15. 
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seek their own survival or advantage.39 Rational systems are consistently striving 
to improve their own efficiency and learn from past experience.40 Open systems 
tend to be driven by institutional beliefs or doctrine. Military systems that assert 
that things have always been done a certain way are much more likely to be 
characterized as open systems. Military factors for RMA exploitation are 
summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Military and Organizational Factors Affecting Diffusion 
and Innovation.41 
Factor Enabler Constraint 
Existing organizational 
preferences 
Parity in power among 
service’s branches 
Asymmetry in power among 
service’s branches skewed 
toward legacy systems 
Domestic pressure High and multiple sources Low 
Experiential base Strong Weak 
International vulnerability High Low 
Organizational type Cybernetic; rational, learning 
system 
Socio-political; military highly 
politicized 
Organization’s beliefs Meshes with innovation Conflicts with innovation 
(e.g. ANZAC spirit) 
Interconnectedness High promotes jointness Low feeds inter-service 
rivalry 
 
These categorical factors will be used to predict Southeast Asia’s potential 
for IRMA exploitation. By examining the political, economic, socio-cultural, and 
military aspects of Southeast Asian countries, one may assess whether they are 
likely to exploit IRMA, potentially yielding predictions of future UAV effectiveness. 
                                            
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Source: Adapted from Goldman, “Military Diffusion and Transformation,” 16. 
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3. Information and Military Performance 
Statecraft is fundamentally about the use of power. As defined by Adda 
Bozeman in her book, Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft, statecraft is “the sum 
total of human dispositions, doctrines, policies, institutions, processes, and 
operations that are designed to assure the governance, security, and survival of 
a politically unified human group.”42 If the old adage about knowledge and 
power is true, the relationship between information and military performance 
is of the utmost importance. Unsurprisingly, there is a large amount of 
scholarly research concerning the dependence of foreign policy on timely and 
accurate intelligence.43 There is little divergence in the literature from the 
acknowledgement of strategic intelligence’s value in policy-making. In the 
multitude of scholarly works on intelligence and policy, empirical evidence is 
presented time and again demonstrating that knowledge gained from intelligence 
is critical for prudent decision-making. Founding OSS member and namesake of 
the Central Intelligence Agency’s analytic tradecraft school Sherman Kent once 
noted that:    
Our policy leaders find themselves in need of a great deal of 
knowledge of foreign countries. They need knowledge which is 
complete, which is   accurate, which is delivered on time, and which 
is capable of giving us the truth, or a closer approximation to the 
truth, than we now enjoy.44 
Intelligence analysis is not conducted for its own sake. Rather, its raison d’ 
être is the timely and relevant delivery of knowledge to a policymaker before a 
decision has to be made. Timeliness is contingent on an information architecture 
that enables the flow of information. One of the most comprehensive works 
consulted in this paper’s preliminary research that discusses the interrelationship 
                                            
42 Adda Bozeman and N. McCrae, Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft: Selected Essays 
(Washington: Brassey’s, 1992): 1. 
43 Sherman Kent, Angelo Codevilla, Adda Bozeman, David Tucker and others have 
informative works specifically focused on the interrelationship between intelligence and statecraft. 
44 Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (Princeton: University 
Press, 2000), 5. 
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between information and power came in a 1996 article in Foreign Affairs. The 
authors’ central prediction is that the country that can best use the tools of the 
information revolution will ultimately yield the greatest power geopolitically.45 
Though the article is 20 years old, the arguments made are as pertinent today as 
when they were written.  
The relevant literature on the relationship between intelligence and military 
effectiveness is notably one-sided. No scholarly work consulted for this thesis 
argues or implies that less intelligence in military operations is better. Even those 
that write extensively about intelligence failure do not argue that a professional 
intelligence bureaucracy should not exist, simply that it should be reformed.46 
Interestingly, there is a proclivity in the growing amount of literature for criticizing 
failures of policy rather than judging events as intelligence failures.47 David 
Bossie and others including the current Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter, 
argue that degrading, downplaying, or ignoring intelligence collection and 
analysis is in itself a failure of policy.48 The trend in the literature is fairly 
straightforward: increasing intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, to 
include UAV use, will directly benefit the execution of statecraft. 
 
                                            
45 Joseph Nye and William A. Owens, “America’s Information Edge,” Foreign Affairs, April 
1996, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1996-03-01/americas-information-
edge. 
46 Many words have been penned over intelligence failure. This thesis does not focus directly 
on intelligence failure, therefore extensive discussion falls outside of the scope of this study. For 
extensive reading on the topic, see: Richard Betts, Robert Jervis, Melvin Goodman, and Dave 
Bossie. 
47 There are numerous scholarly articles and a sizable amount of press editorials that directly 
blame policy-makers for using intelligence failure as a scapegoat for policy failures. See: Stephen 
Marrin, “The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis,” 
Intelligence and National Security 26, no. 2–3 (December, 2011): 
doi:10.1080/02684527.2011.559140.182. 
48 Ashton B. Carter, “A Failure of Policy, Not Spying,” Washington Post, April 3, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20057-2005APR1.html; Dave N. Bossie, 
Intelligence Failure: How Clinton’s National Security Policy Set the Stage for 9/11 (Nashville, TN: 
WorldNetDaily Books, 2004) 
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Emily Goldman’s research specifically addresses the relationship between 
information and military performance. Goldman’s work concludes that:  
Improvements in military performance can be assessed along six 
different dimensions, corresponding to six basic objectives that 
have characterized modern military operations: lethality, reach, 
resupply, accuracy, legitimacy, and timeliness/speed. Information 
resources directly facilitated each of these objectives.49 
4. IRMA Exploitation and UAV Effectiveness 
There is very limited body of work on the relationship between IRMA 
exploitation and UAV effectiveness. Both topics are in nascent stages of 
scholarly research and very few have connected the effectiveness of the UAV 
system to the greater information environment. 
The most relevant work on the topic is a 2015 paper written by Andrea 
and Mauro Gilli. The authors addressed concerns over the potential instability 
caused by the proliferation of unmanned technologies and found that there were 
adoption challenges that limited the effectiveness of the UAVs. Gilli and Gilli 
argue that the number of people and systems required to effectively analyze UAV 
data from advanced systems like the MQ-9 Reaper are the main reason UAV 
proliferation will have a limited effect on international relations in the near 
future.50 The authors note that employing UAVs “requires complex infrastructural 
and organizational support—often beyond the reach of wealthy and developed 
countries.”51 According to the research,  
Many countries have the resources to acquire expensive weapon 
platforms. However, when introducing intensive data gathering 
systems like drones, they ‘“often lack the expertise to integrate and 
support such systems, and at times even use the hardware [while 
                                            
49 Goldman, “Information Resources and Military Performance,” 9. 
50 Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare? Industrial, Organizational, 
and Infrastructural Constraints: Military Innovations and the Ecosystem Challenge” (master’s 
thesis, Stanford University, 2015), 36, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2425750. 
51 Ibid., 24. 
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their] organizations struggle with managing the new flood of data, 
drawing relevant conclusions, and initiating the appropriate 
response.”52 
Furthermore, the paper notes how difficult it is for even advanced military forces 
to incorporate net-centric warfare assets into their organizations. The authors 
argue that adoption of UAVs “calls for difficult and lengthy doctrinal adaptation 
and organizational change as armed forces must become proficient in the 
language of net-centric warfare (i.e., the rapid acquisition, exploitation, and 
dissemination of information across different sensors, nodes, platforms, and 
sensors).”53 Gilli and Gilli’s research directly addresses the difficulties global UAV 
proliferation and stands in stark contrast to those that assert the UAVs are, by 
themselves, strategically relevant.  
5. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Southeast Asia 
Two of the main themes in contemporary work on Southeast Asian 
security are maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea and regional 
military modernization. Both concepts are associated with regional growth in, and 
the increased procurement of, UAVs. This section discusses the current state of 
UAV scholarship in Southeast Asia and regional UAV market growth. 
Scholarly work on UAV adoption in Southeast Asia is lacking in breadth 
and depth. The literature focuses more on UAV acquisition and less on UAV use 
or the benefits of UAV employment. Most research focuses on defense analysts’ 
projections for massive growth in the UAV market with little analysis as to what 
this could mean in regional politics. Analysis by regional scholars focuses on the 
implications of armed unmanned systems more than the far more prevalent types 
used for reconnaissance.  
                                            
52 Ibid. 
53 Gilli, “The Diffusion of Drone Warfare,” 30. 
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Desmond Ball offers the most pertinent analysis of the likely effects of 
unmanned ISR platform expansion in Southeast Asia, though it is over a 
decade old. Ball argues rather forcefully that increases in EEZ surveillance will 
“generate tensions and more frequent crises; they will produce escalatory 
dynamics; and on balance they will lead to less stability in the most affected 
regions, including especially Asia.”54 Ball’s analysis focuses on the escalatory 
nature of increased collection activity as the basis for concluding that more ISR 
equates to more conflict. Notably absent from Ball’s analysis is consideration for 
the intelligence obtained through UAV employment. Though difficult to 
incorporate in his analysis, policy decisions made because of UAV-derived 
intelligence could arguably decrease instances of crisis through reduced 
misperception. The lack of writing on the implications of drone proliferation in 
Southeast Asia could be explained by a lack of familiarity on the part of scholars 
with UAV-derived intelligence and what that can provide to military commanders 
and politicians alike. 
Unmanned aerial vehicles are not necessarily new to the Southeast Asian 
region, with discussions of their adoption appearing in scholarly works nearly 
a decade old. The pace at which Southeast Asian countries are procuring or 
producing new unmanned aerial vehicles has, however, accelerated in the 
last five years. Southeast Asian countries are improving indigenous UAV 
development capabilities with Singapore leading the charge for a Southeast 
Asian export market.55 
The majority of unmanned platforms procured by Southeast Asian 
militaries are imported from market leaders like the United States, Israel, and 
increasingly, China.56 Analysis of the Asia-Pacific region in 2005 yielded 
                                            
54 Desmond Ball, “Intelligence Collection Operations and EEZs: The Implications of New 
Technology,” Marine Policy 28 (July, 2004): 67–74.  
55 Michael Blades, Global UAS Indigenous Programs, (San Antonio, TX: Frost and Sullivan, 
2015), http://www.marketresearch.com/product/sample-9199075.pdf, 11.  
56 Ibid., 12. 
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predictions of a potential $7 billion USD market through 2025 for unmanned 
aerial vehicles.57 More recent analysis predicts that the figure could grow to 
$1.7 billion USD per year by 2017, more than doubling original estimates.58 Asia 
remains the second largest buyer of drones outside of the United States. 
Southeast Asia makes up a small, but growing segment of the Asian drone 
market with massive increases in defense spending over the past 15 years. From 
2001–2016, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Philippines 
experienced an average defense budget increase of 288%.59 Singapore’s 
defense budget grew from $5.4 billion USD in 2001 to $14.78 billion USD with 
$2.6 billion programmed for procurement in 2016 alone. On November 17, 2015, 
the United States pledged $119 million in military assistance to Southeast Asia in 
FY2015 and $140 million in FY16 dedicated to developing Southeast Asian 
maritime capabilities.60 In the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia 
specifically, the funds are dedicated to increasing ISR, patrol capabilities, and 
aircraft procurement for maritime domain awareness.61 Increases in military 
assistance also coincide with the lifting of a ban on exporting armed UAVs to 
security partners worldwide.62 Southeast Asian defense procurement budgets are 
growing concurrent with the surging number of international firms seeking to sell 
unmanned systems. 
                                            
57 Kelvin Wong, “Armed Drones in Asia,” RSIS Commentaries 97 (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam 
School of International Studies, August, 2010), 2.  
58 Guy Martin, “Asian Region UAV Capability on the Rise,” Defence Review Asia, December 
19, 2012, http://www.defencereviewasia.com/articles/195/Asian-region-UAV-capability-on-the-
rise. 
59 “Defence Budgets,” IHS Jane’s, accessed December 14, 2015, 
https://janes.ihs.com/CustomPages/Janes/Jdb/JdbHome.aspx.  
60 “FACT SHEET: U.S. Building Maritime Capacity in Southeast Asia,” White House, 
November 17, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/11/17/fact-sheet-us-
building-maritime-capacity-southeast-asia. 
61 Ibid. 
62 “South-East Asia: Drone Sales May Raise Terror Risks,” Oxford Analytica, March 13, 
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Southeast Asian acquisition and production of UAVs is continuing at a 
rapid pace. Although exact numbers within respective orders of battle are 
difficult to come by and change frequently, there is information available about 
the types of platforms already obtained and which systems are potential 
acquisitions in the future. 
a. Singapore 
Singapore has the most advanced UAV capability of all Southeast Asian 
militaries. It has had an operational UAV capability since 1994.63 Singapore 
operates numerous indigenous platforms and has strong relationships with Israeli 
producers. It is known to operate the Israeli Aerospace Industries’ Hermes and 
Heron platforms.64 Singapore also demonstrated is shipborne tactical UAV 
capability by deploying the Insitu ScanEagle during the CARAT 2015 exercises 
with the United States.65 Singapore is focusing on expanding its medium altitude 
long endurance (MALE) capability in the near future.  
b. Indonesia 
Indonesia has limited operational UAV capability but is expanding. 
President Joko Widodo intends to modernize the Indonesian military and stated 
his intention to acquire unmanned aerial vehicles to combat illegal fishing and 
piracy within Indonesia’s vast EEZ.66 Development using commercial-off-the-
shelf platforms (COTS) enables the Indonesian Navy to rapidly assemble and 
operate UAVs with limited acquisition lead time. Indonesia was to acquire “eight 
indigenously-developed Wulung tactical UAV systems and a number of remote 
                                            
63 IHS Jane’s “Singapore Procurement,”Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment–Southeast 
Asia, accessed December 14, 2015, https://janes.ihs.com/SouthEastAsia/Display/1305144.  
64 IHS Jane’s, “Singapore Procurement.” 
65 “US, Singaporean Navies Debut UAV Operations in ‘CARAT’ Exercise,” IHS Jane’s, July 
14, 2015, accessed December 14, 2015, http://www.janes.com/article/52977/us-singaporean-
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66 Haeril Halim, “Jokowi Wins On Prabowo’s Turf,” The Jakarta Post, June 23, 2014, 
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ground stations by the end of 2015.”67 The program has developed steadily since 
2004 and is now approaching deployment.68 
c. Malaysia 
Malaysia utilizes a number of indigenously-produced platforms and leases 
numerous platforms from foreign companies like Insitu.69 MALE platforms like the 
Aludra Mk 1, Aludra Mk 2, and Yabhon Aludra as well as tactical platforms like 
Insitu’s ScanEagle patrol near Semporna and are operated primarily out of 
Kudat.70 Malaysia’s capabilities are growing and increasingly being observed 
operating in the maritime domain.  
d. Vietnam 
Vietnam’s primary UAV system is the indigenously-produced Patrol VT 
tactical UAV.71 It is expanding domestic production of UAV systems to improve 
its ISR capabilities. Interest in acquisition from foreign defense companies is 
increasing. According to press reports, “Industry sources told Reuters that 
Vietnam was in discussions with Swedish defence contractor Saab, the 
European multinational Eurofighter, the defence wing of Airbus and U.S. firms 
Lockheed Martin and Boeing.”72 Vietnam is also considering purchase of systems 
from Belarus and Israel.73 
                                            
67 IHS Jane’s, “Indonesia Procurement,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast 
Asia, accessed December 14, 2015, https://janes.ihs.com/SouthEastAsia/Display/1305012.  
68  Ibid. 
69 IHS Jane’s, “Malaysia Procurement,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Southeast 
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e. Philippines 
The Philippines has two General Atomics Predator UAVs registered with 
the national security advisor and a plan, as of 2013, to purchase more tactical 
UAVs to support expeditionary and marine forces.74 
6. IRMA Exploitation in Southeast Asia 
In general, Asia has seen a vast expansion and improvement in its war-
fighting capability in the previous two decades.75 While there has certainly been 
tangible progress in military acquisitions and upgrades, upgrades in C4ISR 
capabilities are more relevant to discussions of IRMA exploitation. Some 
Southeast Asian countries have made significant improvements to their 
underlying information infrastructure, but it is far from uniform. Singapore is 
perhaps the most advanced, with a secure network that utilizes multiple 
communications paths to connect its air and maritime surveillance information.76 
Doctrinally, Singapore’s “Integrated Knowledge-Based Command and Control” 
(IKC2) is focused on the “acquisition, development, and integration of 
technologies for command and control with intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance systems and with precision-guided weapons.”77 Sam Bateman’s 
analysis of the Asian maritime security environment asserts that regional C4ISR 
capabilities are expected to increase.78 Bateman argues that the wider use of 
drones will enhance information-sharing and maritime domain awareness, 
especially in concert with the aforementioned C4ISR improvements.79  
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Most countries today, however, fall short of the progress that Singapore 
has demonstrated. Richard Bitzinger argues that there are several socio-political 
impediments and traditions that are getting in the way of Southeast Asian IRMA 
exploitation.80 He argues that while it is probably too early to talk about IRMA for 
most Southeast Asian countries, it will remain a contentious and legitimate 
subject of discussion for years to come due to its current relevance in a number 
of regional security issues.81 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Fundamentally, this analysis is about whether UAVs require IRMA 
exploitation to be effectively employed. The impressive qualities that UAVs bring 
to a country’ military capabilities appear to rely on a sophisticated informational 
architecture representative of the IRMA. 
Hypothesis One: UAVs require extensive IRMA exploitation to be 
effective. This hypothesis asserts that UAVs are completely reliant on an 
overarching C4ISR infrastructure and doctrinal acceptance within the military to 
be effective. Extensive IRMA-exploitation provides policymakers near real-time 
access to information, networked C2, near-complete situational awareness, and 
the ability to make predictive policy decisions. Extensive exploitation of the IRMA 
increases the speed at which policy instruments like precision strikes can be 
employed in response to UAV-derived intelligence. 
Hypothesis Two: UAVs require partial IRMA exploitation to be effective. 
This hypothesis elevates the importance of the drone itself. In this model, the 
unique capabilities of the platform and the advantage that it provides to countries 
that were previously unable to field any reliable airborne reconnaissance 
capability are enough to affect the status quo on the ground or in the water. UAV 
use from tactical units can drive immediate decisions provided the country’s 
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military chain of command provides such authorities. This hypothesis also 
acknowledges that there has been at least a partial change in doctrine, 
organization, or IT capability that drives a commander in the field to seek UAV-
derived intelligence. 
Hypothesis Three: UAVs are effective or ineffective regardless of IRMA 
exploitation. This hypothesis asserts that IRMA exploitation has no impact on 
UAV measures of effectiveness. This eventuality has the least support based on 
the review of relevant literature. Since the UAV’s purpose is either defined or 
enabled by humans in the information environment, this hypothesis is most likely 
to be true only in cases of fully-autonomous UAV platforms: a technology that 
has not yet seen maturity. 
Once confirmed, one of these hypotheses may help predict the effects of 
UAV proliferation in Southeast Asia. Examining the UAV capabilities of the 
individual countries and their proclivity for IRMA exploitation may elucidate which 
countries are poised for information advantage, particularly in the maritime 
domain. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis will provide a comparative analysis of UAV use in countries 
whose ability to exploit IRMA ranges from extremely low to very high. First, the 
thesis will examine IRMA-exploiting countries that use UAVs like the United 
States and China. Next, it will explore non- or partial IRMA-exploiting countries 
like Iran, Italy, and Brazil. A comparison among these countries will help assess 
the relationship between IRMA exploitation and UAV effectiveness. Then, this 
thesis will assess the potential effectiveness of countries in Southeast Asia that 
have recently acquired UAV capabilities. With UAV technology spreading from 
global powers to developing countries throughout the world, there is no single 
case study or regional issue that universally explains the relationship between 
UAV effectiveness and the IRMA. Southeast Asia’s recent and growing adoption 
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of unmanned technology, relative lack of C4I infrastructure, and maritime security 
challenges, make it an ideal region to analyze within the context of this study. 
This research consults a wide range of sources to include scholarly books, 
journals, articles, official publications, university research, and reports from 
influential think tanks and NGOs. There is extensive press coverage of UAV 
proliferation in Asia and Southeast Asia that can provide valuable information 
about regional trends and use. Data from unclassified sources on foreign military 
acquisitions, defense budgets, and military capacity help build a picture of the 
current UAV capabilities and IRMA exploitation. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The forthcoming chapters will provide a detailed analysis of UAV 
proliferation and use in multiple countries. This introductory chapter established 
the research questions, defined key terms and concepts, and introduced 
previous research in the field.  
Chapter II is a detailed analysis of countries that operate UAVs and have 
exploited the IRMA. Using the U.S. and the China as case studies, the chapter 
will highlight how UAVs feed into their larger information and decision-making 
architecture. 
Chapter III is similarly structured in its analysis of UAV-operating countries 
that do not appear to have exploited the IRMA. Iran is a good case study 
because of its long history of UAV employment and relative aversion to 
innovative concepts like the IRMA. Several other countries like Italy and Brazil 
will also be examined. 
Chapter IV takes the lessons learned from the United States, China, Iran 
and others and compares them to the emerging UAV users in Southeast Asia. 
Focusing on Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, the 
analysis will examine current and projected UAV platforms, current IRMA 
exploitation, and/or receptiveness to the diffusion of RMA. The diffusion 
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diagnostic model is applicable in these cases because many of them have not, 
by many analysts’ standards, exploited the IRMA. 
Finally, Chapter V will address the hypotheses and address the research 
questions. It will also provide an assessment of the potential asymmetric value of 
UAV-derived intelligence and recommended actions for Southeast Asian 
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II. MARITIME UAV EMPLOYMENT BY INFORMATION 
RMA-EXPLOITING STATES 
To better understand the relationship between UAV effectiveness and 
IRMA exploitation, this study selected case studies from countries that 
demonstrate both concepts. The two countries, the United States and China, are 
from different geographic areas with distinct cultural and political characteristics. 
Both countries utilize a range of unmanned platforms, especially in the maritime 
domain. The U.S. and China have advanced C4ISR infrastructures and have 
optimized their respective military structures to operate in an informationalized 
environment. This chapter will compare and contrast the U.S. and China as 
examples of state actors that utilize UAVs and have exploited the IRMA. A 
comprehensive overview of every unmanned platform in the U.S. and Chinese 
arsenal is unnecessary within the scope of this study. 
A. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The U.S. is involved in maritime disputes around the world. From 
promoting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea to patrolling strategic 
maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. has a particular need for 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) at sea. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the United States is the global leader in unmanned systems 
research and employment.82 While the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper 
platforms remain the most ubiquitous symbols of America’s contribution to 
unmanned warfare, there are nearly 200 different maritime-related unmanned 
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platforms in service or in a developmental status with the United States 
government.83 
1. Maritime Challenges 
For the United States, disputes at sea or in littoral waters usually arise 
when other countries’ claims infringe on the freedom of navigation. Maritime UAV 
employment for the United States does not focus on enforcing its own territorial 
claims, rather on gaining intelligence regarding the status of disputes to which 
the United States is not a belligerent. The United States also utilizes unmanned 
aircraft to assist in maintaining maritime domain awareness of foreign military 
ships, submarines, and port facilities. 
Though not directly involved in maritime disputes in the South China Sea, 
the U.S. utilizes reconnaissance assets including UAVs to maintain situational 
awareness on tactical and operational developments between claimants. China’s 
claims in the South China Sea conflict with those of several Southeast Asian 
states, particularly in the Spratly Islands. U.S. foreign policy goals in the South 
China Sea include deterring China from militarizing land formations in the 
Spratlys and ensuring freedom of the seas for civil and naval vessels alike.84 
Despite not being a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), the U.S. has an interest in recognizing the legitimately claimed 
territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of all states.  
Another significant maritime dispute that the U.S. monitors is Iran’s 
excessive territorial water and airspace claims in the Arabian Gulf. In 1973, Iran 
asserted its baseline claim to extend in a straight line from the outermost portions 
of its territorial waters. By extending its baseline claims, Iran has, in the United 
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States’ view, illegitimately expanded its territorial waters and airspace, all while 
increasing the size of its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).85 The increased 
baseline claim, coupled with a history of hostile encounters at sea between U.S. 
and Iranian vessels, a strategic choke point in the Strait of Hormuz, and larger 
geopolitical issues at play have contributed to an increased U.S. presence in the 
Arabian Gulf and the related need for maritime ISR assets. 
2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Capability 
The U.S. has the most sophisticated unmanned aerial program in 
the world. U.S. drones range from tactical airframes capable of delivering 
lethal effects to long-dwell persistent ISR platforms. The U.S. uses unmanned 
platforms for missions ranging from high-value target elimination to maritime 
reconnaissance. 
a. Current Platforms 
There are well over 500 distinct unmanned platforms publicly known to be 
part of the U.S. unmanned arsenal or in development with defense contractors.86 
Platforms like the MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4 Global Hawk, and the 
RQ-170 Sentinel dominate the headlines because of their persistence in 
Afghanistan, Syria, the Horn of Africa, and other battlefields in the Global War on 
Terrorism. Despite the public focus on counter-terror and counter-insurgency 
missions, maritime platforms including the MQ-4C Triton, RQ-21 Blackjack, and 
MQ-8C Fire Scout exist at the cutting edge of UAV technology and are receiving 
significant funding in defense procurement efforts.87 
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The U.S. military uses a variety of platforms in the maritime domain, even 
ones that were not specifically designed for maritime use. The majority of the 
U.S. Navy’s maritime UAV platforms are considered small tactical unmanned 
aerial systems (STUAS). The ScanEagle and RQ-21A Blackjack STUAS 
platforms can be launched from ships at sea. They are limited in their range and 
on-station time but provide the Navy a unique capability that does not require 
vertical takeoff and landing. The U.S. Air Force maintains the only credible 
unmanned aerial strike capability at sea with the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 
Reaper platforms; however, both aircraft are not optimized for the maritime 
environment. Although some platforms certainly work better over the sea, almost 
all unmanned platforms can be used in a maritime reconnaissance capacity. 
(1) Capital Investment 
Of the $4.14 trillion FY17 defense budget submitted to Congress in 
February 2016, $1.35 billion were dedicated to UAV procurement.88 Although the 
Air Force received the majority of the funding to purchase 24 additional MQ-9 
Reapers, $464.7 million of the remaining funds went into acquiring two of the 
Navy’s MQ-4C Triton high-altitude long endurance (HALE) systems.89 Despite an 
overall DOD UAV budget reduction of 25%, Congress expects to maintain stable 
funding levels for the Navy’s RQ-21A Blackjack and MQ-8B/C Fire Scout for the 
five-year Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).90 
b. UAV Employment 
The Navy relies most heavily on two airframes to handle the majority of its 
operations at sea. The RQ-4A, also known as the Broad Area Maritime 
Surveillance—Demonstrator (BAMS-D), is the immediate precursor to the MQ-4C 
Triton. The RQ-4A utilizes the same airframe as the USAF Global Hawk with 
                                            




modifications made to the sensor packages onboard the aircraft in support of its 
maritime mission.91 The aircraft primarily conducts open water and littoral 
surveillance with its signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence 
(IMINT) sensors. It collects Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals and has 
an electro-optical, infrared, synthetic aperture radar (SAR), and inverse synthetic 
aperture radar (ISAR) capability with a dwell time of up to thirty hours.92 The 
United States primarily deploys the BAMS-D for HALE maritime missions in the 
Middle East.93 The two BAMS-D airframes in the U.S. inventory have operated 
consistently since 2009 and are expected to sustain operations until the full 
integration of the MQ-4C Triton upgrade.94 Figure 1 displays the U.S. Navy’s RQ-
4A BAMS-D platform. When considering A2AD environments, unmanned HALE 
platforms offer a unique advantage. The MQ-4C Triton is expected to be one 
means of intelligence collection in denied areas where the employment of 
traditional maritime patrol aircraft like the EP-3 Aries and P-8 Poseidon would put 
crew members at risk. 
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Figure 1.  U.S. Navy RQ-4A Broad Area Maritime Surveillance—
Demonstrator (BAMS-D).95 
The Insitu ScanEagle, recently acquired by Boeing, is the primary aircraft 
utilized by the United States for surveillance at sea. Figure 2 depicts a 
ScanEagle UAV at sea. With 206 in the inventory, the United States Navy sends 
many of is Arleigh Burke-class missile destroyers and amphibious warships to 
sea with ScanEagle detachments aboard.96 The ScanEagle is deployed with a 
pneumatic launcher from the deck of a vessel or a shore site, eliminating the 
need for a runway.97 ScanEagle recovers by hooking onto a proprietary vertical 
cable Insitu developed.98 The ScanEagle has electro-optical, infrared, and 
SIGINT sensor packages that can be utilized to collect intelligence.99  
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The United States Navy and DARPA are developing a vertical take-off and 
landing (VTOL) ISR and strike UAV called the Tactically Exploited 
Reconnaissance Node (TERN).100 The TERN program is designed to add an 
unmanned platform to nearly every ship in the fleet, vastly improving maritime 
domain awareness capability and ad hoc military strike. The program is expected 
to demonstrate the capability in 2018 with full scale production undertaken by 
Northrop Grumman.101 
 
Figure 2.  U.S. Navy ScanEagle.102 
3. Exploitation of the Information Revolution in Military Affairs 
The U.S. fully exploits the IRMA. Using a network of sensors tied to 
command and control nodes, decision-makers receive a near-complete picture of 
the battlespace, use predictive analysis to calculate the implications of their 
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decisions, and strike with precise lethality. This net-centric approach to warfare 
benefits greatly from a range of unmanned vehicles capable of collecting data 
and providing timely strike options with no risk to U.S. personnel. Simultaneously, 
the benefits of all-source fusion analysis improve the mission effectiveness of the 
unmanned platform. 
a. Sensors 
The United States has an extensive sensor capability in a range of 
intelligence disciplines. Satellite, air, ground, surface, subsurface, and cyber 
sensor capabilities are available to the U.S. intelligence community.103 UAVs 
are a large part of the U.S. sensor network. Data from unmanned platforms 
filter back to networked analysis centers like Distributed Ground Station One 
(DGS-1) at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. The 6000 airmen that work at 
DGS-1 analyze 20 terabytes of data each day. These airmen process 
approximately 460,000 hours of full-motion video and disseminate 2.6 million 
images to the intelligence community, Defense Department, and civilian decision-
makers every year.104 
While many sensors can be seen as passive data collection nodes, 
exploitation of the IRMA allows for higher quality sensing, especially from flexible 
platforms like UAVs. The U.S. Air Force Distributed Common Ground System 
(DCGS) Analysis and Reporting Teams (DART) fuse multiple sources of 
intelligence and cue unmanned assets to investigate potential threats.105 The 
UAV is made a much more effective asset by maneuvering in concert with real-
time intelligence reporting. 
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b. Command and Control 
The U.S. DOD has extensive command and control capabilities at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. With civilian oversight, command 
decisions are enabled by an advanced network-centric information technology 
infrastructure. U.S. C2 doctrine is codified in DOD Joint Publications and 
facilitated by a secure supporting communications system.106 Critically, networks 
used for C2 also enable the sharing of intelligence. “Control and appropriate 
sharing of information is a prerequisite to maintaining effective C2.”107 
c. Precision Strike 
The U.S. military has an advanced precision strike capability. Precision-
guided munitions (PGM) are core to the application of military force. The U.S. 
maintains precision strike capability with nuclear and conventional ballistic 
missiles, cruise missiles, and bombs in all warfare domains. UAVs add to the 
precision strike capability by employing or guiding PGMs. Unmanned combat 
systems shorten the kill chain and enable the striking of ad hoc targets without 
prior planning. 
d. Situational Awareness 
American forces and policymakers are enabled by information technology, 
intelligence capabilities, and a network-centric organizational design to maintain 
global situational awareness on a range of political, economic, and security 
related issues. The White House Situation Room, National Military Command 
Center, and other joint operations centers are physical manifestations of and 
hubs for situational awareness within the U.S. national security apparatus. The 
U.S. military maintains all-source intelligence fusion capabilities ranging from the 
unit to the combatant command level. Civilian and military intelligence 
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organizations communicate with one another at the tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels to provide the clearest and most accurate pictures of the 
battlespace. 
U.S. doctrine indicates that situational awareness is a fundamental 
component of C2.108 Situational awareness is “a prerequisite for commanders 
anticipating opportunities and challenges. True situational understanding should 
be the basis for all decision makers.”109 UAVs provide real-time input to a 
commander’s understanding of the battlespace. 
e. Predictive Decision-Making 
Intelligence drives operations for the United States military. The U.S. uses 
information from various sensors and fuses them into intelligence assessments. 
Commanders make predictive decisions based on potential courses of action and 
the expected outcomes of their decisions. U.S. doctrine indicates that a clear 
operational picture helps make effective decisions in anticipation of an 
adversary’s movement. “The commander who can gather information and make 
better decisions faster will generate a rapid tempo of operation sand gain a 
decided advantage.”110 An information advantage allows commanders to make 
decisions with confidence that the outcome will reflect their intentions. 
4. Conclusion 
The U.S. is engaged in military conflicts and geopolitical disputes in 
worldwide. The country’s maritime disputes and ISR requirements usually occur 
far from U.S. territorial waters. The United States’ principal foreign policy goals in 
getting involved in maritime disputes are either to address a direct security 
concern or in support of common international agreements like the UNCLOS. 
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To support its foreign policy goals at sea, the United States military 
employs unmanned aerial vehicles to receive tactical information on belligerents 
or changes in the battlespace. Legacy platforms modified for maritime use like 
the BAMS-D as well as new and innovative maritime surveillance platforms like 
the ScanEagle give the United States an information advantage at a far lower 
risk and cost than traditional manned reconnaissance programs. The United 
States invests heavily in unmanned technologies and has plans for substantial 
increases in UAVs at sea in the future and over its FYDP. 
Exploiting the IRMA enables the U.S. government to more quickly utilize 
the information gained from UAV platforms for maritime domain awareness, 
tactically shift military assets, and present evidence of UNCLOS violations on an 
international stage. The United States’ networked sensors and C2 capabilities 
enable near-complete situational awareness which assists in making predictive 
decisions and in the employment of its considerable precision strike capability. 
The adoption and advancement of maritime UAV technologies for use by 
the United States military helps it more readily accomplish its maritime-specific 
policy goals. Fully exploiting the IRMA is a critical factor for the successful use of 
UAVs and amplifies the effectiveness and importance of their employment. Even 
at the tactical level, IRMA exploitation is required to translate information 
collected from unmanned assets into actionable intelligence. The UAV and the 
intelligence it collects cannot operate in a useful manner without being tied into a 
larger information architecture that advantages predictive decision making. The 
effectiveness of the unmanned system is directly tied the IRMA exploitation. 
B. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
The PRC has quickly developed one of the most advanced UAV 
capabilities in the world. As it begins to expand its sphere of influence to distant 
seas, the PRC’s need for high fidelity intelligence grows. With the Chinese 
military not significantly engaged in any major ground conflicts external to its 
borders, China’s principal disputes are territorial conflicts in the South and East 
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China Sea. China has a robust C4ISR capability, a well-developed IT 
infrastructure, and considerable governmental support.111 It has partially 
exploited the IRMA. 
1. Maritime Challenges 
China is engaged in several maritime disputes. China’s claims in the 
South China Sea underlie many of its conflicts with neighboring countries. China 
also has a notable and ongoing dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, 
maritime disputes with Vietnam, and fishing disputes with multiple countries in 
the region. In both the South and East China Seas, China has begun using 
unmanned platforms in support of its operations.112 
Although China’s claim over many of the features in the South China Sea 
was invalidated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in July of 
2016, it is unlikely to relinquish de facto control of its outposts in the Spratly 
Islands. Reclamation efforts at Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef are similar to 
previous Chinese efforts at Woody Island.113 In 2015 and 2016, China stationed 
BZK-005 UAVs on Woody Island in the South China Sea, extending the 
platform’s maritime surveillance range into the South China Sea.114 
China and Japan both claim the Senkaku Islands, located approximately 
205 miles due east of the Chinese mainland. Tokyo’s purchase of three of the 
islands in 2012 from their private Japanese owner intensified the dispute 
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between the two countries.115 Since the Chinese declared an Air Defense 
Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2013 that included the Senkaku Islands, Chinese 
and Japanese fighters have repeatedly responded to one another, coming as 
close as 100 feet of separation in 2014.116 China began deploying at least 
three BZK-005 UAVs from Daishan Island for operations over the Senkaku 
Islands in 2013.117 
2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Capability 
China began investing heavily in unmanned technology beginning in the 
early 2000s.118 It currently deploys or exports tactical and medium-altitude, long 
endurance (MALE) UAVs for surveillance and precision strike. China’s drone 
inventory is constantly growing and evolving, making any inventory a mere 
snapshot in time. Identifying the platforms by name is no less challenging, as the 
aircraft and their upgrades almost all go by different names in both Chinese and 
translated English. Although industry watchdogs like IHS Jane’s keep close tabs 
on military and commercial development, there are close to 100 UAV-related 
companies that are either state-owned or privately operated.119 China’s export 
market primarily consists of MALE platforms like the Yilong which it makes 
attractive due to China’s lack of export restrictions and comparatively low price to 
similar U.S. models. 
a. Current Platforms 
China currently deploys several tactical and MALE platforms with its 
military. The most commonly observed platforms are the BZK-005, the Yilong, 
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and the CH-4. China’s Yilong, also known as the Pterodactyl, closely resembles 
the General Atomics MQ-1 Predator. China’s CH-4, displayed in Figure 4, 
appears to be a copy of the MQ-9 Reaper.120 China has exported CH-3 and CH-
4 platforms to Iraq, the UAE, Nigeria, and Myanmar.121 China flew its BZK-005, a 
MALE surveillance aircraft depicted in Figure 3, over the Senkaku Islands in 
September 2013. The platform was indigenously produced and is intended to fly 
a similar profile to the RQ-4 Global Hawk but flies a much lower flight profile. 
Overall, more than 300 UAVs are in service within the Chinese military.122 
 
Figure 3.  Chinese Harbin BZK-005 UAV.123 
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(1) Capital Investment 
China’s FY17 defense budget is approximately $200 billion with 
$27.8 billion set aside for procurement.124 China’s procurement budget has 
grown by approximately $10 billion in the last five years despite an economic 
slowdown in recent years. China does not break its budget out for each branch of 
service in the People’s Liberation Army. China’s notorious secrecy over its 
budget makes it difficult to determine how much of the Chinese budget is 
invested in unmanned platforms. Its unmanned systems programs fall under 
the PLA’s General Armament Department and General Staff Department.125 
b. UAV Employment 
China’s UAV operations are difficult to assess due to high levels of state 
secrecy and the relatively few times that China’s UAVs have been observed in 
operation. China’s PLA employs its unmanned platforms primarily in the maritime 
domain. Chinese press reports of UAV training indicate that UAVs are deployed 
to identify unknown radar contacts at sea. A March 2016 Chinese press article 
described a military exercise over the East China Sea during which an 
unidentified UAV system is directed to reconnoiter a radar target at sea.126 
According to the article, “The mission controller switched to reconnaissance 
mode and adjusted the reconnaissance view angle. An intelligence analyst 
interpreted images accurately and in detail, and sent up an intelligence 
report…Very quickly a number of missiles roared away from ships and 
warplanes, headed for a target sea area.”127 It is difficult to determine if the 
description of Chinese training is accurate, notional, or merely theater to project 
                                            
124 Craig Caffrey, “China Defence Budget,” Jane’s Defence Budgets, March 14, 2016, 
https://janes.ihs.com/Janes/Display/1327472. 
125 Chase et al., “Emerging Trends in China’s Development of Unmanned Systems.” 
126 Liu Changpeng, Liu Linqing, and Zhao Haitao, “A Regiment Explores How to Boost Its 
Combat Power, Adds ‘Will to Win’ to Its Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Renmin Haijun, March 15, 
2016, p. 3. 
127 Ibid. 
 46
competency in unmanned systems deployment. The article also cites an incident 
in 2013 where UAVs were deployed to track foreign vessels near Chinese 
territorial waters. There is no further information about the interaction that could 
confirm the deployment but the timing is consistent with Chinese BZK-005 
operations near the Senkaku Islands. 
Although employment of Chinese UAVs including the CH-3, Yilong, and 
CH-4 platforms have principally been carried out by export recipients, their 
reputation for effectiveness as a cheaper alternative to the Predator is growing. 
On average, the Yilong costs one third of the MQ-1 Predator.128 In December, 
2015 Iraqi forces utilized a CH-4 to launch airborne strikes.129 
 
Figure 4.  Chinese-Exported CH-4B UAV in Iraq.130 
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3. Exploitation of the Information Revolution in Military Affairs 
a. Sensors 
China has rapidly expanded its remote sensing capabilities with the 
introduction of sub-meter satellite imaging in 2014 and a maturing over-the-
horizon detection and targeting capability.131 According to a DOD analysis, 
“Long-range air surveillance radars and airborne early warning aircraft…are said 
to extend China’s detection range well beyond its borders.”132 The few times that 
Chinese UAVs have been observed operating at sea suggest that they were not 
the primary detection sensor of foreign naval capabilities. As with the Chinese 
press article, China does not appear to use UAVs for preliminary detection of 
targets. In June 2011, a Japanese P-3 observed a PLAN UAV operating near a 
Jiangwei II frigate. The P-3 was operating well within the radar detection range of 
the frigate and it is suspected that the PLAN wanted the vessel to be 
photographed operating at sea for propaganda purposes.133 There is no 
evidence beyond the Chinese article to suggest that Chinese UAVs serve as 
cuing assets for PLAN vessels or aircraft. 
b. Command and Control 
China places a high priority on C2. Technological and organizational 
changes in the PLA’s structure combine with its broad goal of an 
informationalized battlefield to make joint operations in multiple locations 
efficient.134 China is modernizing its command systems to make them more 
secure, reliable, and useful to commanders in the field.135 According to U.S. 
                                            
131 United States Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, April 7, 2015 (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2015), 13. 
132 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments, 37. 
133 James C. Bussert, “Chinese Navy Employs UAV Assets,” Signal Magazine, April 2012, 
http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/2918. 
134 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments, 37. 
135 Ibid., 38. 
 48
DOD assessments, “The PLA views technological improvements to C4I systems 
as essential to its broader goals of informationalization, which seeks to 
improve the speed and effectiveness of decision-making while providing secure 
and reliable communications to fixed and mobile command posts.”136 There is 
no evidence to suggest that China leverages its C2 capabilities in the use 
of its UAVs. 
c. Precision Strike 
The PRC has a world-class precision strike capability. In addition to its 
highly accurate short, medium, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, China 
utilizes advanced LACM and PGMs.137 China’s activities in cyberspace 
demonstrate a capability to accurately reach targets in the logical and persona 
layers of the domain. This level of accuracy could be used to precisely conduct 
computer network attack (CNA). UAVs are a new addition to the precision-strike 
capabilities of the PLA. China has demonstrated through its export sales that its 
UAVs have the capacity to strike targets with PGMs.138 
d. Situational Awareness 
China considers information dominance to be the key to winning modern 
conflict.139 According to Dean Cheng’s review of foreign military analyst 
research, China considers information dominance to be “the ability to gather, 
transmit, manage, analyze, and exploit information, and preventing an opponent 
from doing the same.”140 New C4I technologies like the Integrated Command 
Platform (ICP) vastly help the PLA in achieving its goals of an informationalized 
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military. According to DOD analysis, the ICP provides “intelligence, battlefield 
information, logistical information, and weather reports, which give commander 
improved situational awareness.”141 UAVs in theory should help provide greater 
fidelity on maritime contacts. In practice, there is very little evidence to support 
this theory. 
The U.S. Office of Naval intelligence noted that Chinese expansion of 
naval missions beyond its littorals has precipitated an improvement in maritime 
situational awareness.142 Despite this innovation, China’s best source of 
information on maritime contacts remains direct reporting from naval and law 
enforcement vessels. China’s sensor network is still maturing. Little is known 
about how the different data sources are actually processed, analyzed, and 
disseminated to commanders in mainland China or at sea.  
e. Predictive Decision-Making 
Chinese decision-making, particularly in crisis situations, falls to senior 
leadership within the Chinese Communist Party. China’s leadership receives 
stovepiped intelligence streams from the CCP, PLA, and Ministry of State 
Security (MSS).143 The Central Military Commission (CMC) usually holds a 
meeting to discuss the intelligence once it is received. Despite multiple streams 
of intelligence, China still is subject unplanned or uncontrolled behavior. 
According to scholars, this is due to local PLA leaders who are not closely 
controlled by civilian party members.144 The disconnect between policymakers 
and military officials can at times lead to uncoordinated and confusing signaling, 
complicating the prediction of policy decisions. 
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Chinese efforts to improve its decisive processes focus on the speed of 
information acquisition, processing, and decision-making.145 Timely and accurate 
information helps facilitate prediction. “In particular the transmission of ISR data 
in near-real-time to commanders in the field can facilitate the commander’s 
decision-making process, shortening command timelines, and making operations 
more efficient.”146 
4. Conclusion 
China’s principal external security challenges exist in the maritime domain. 
With disputes between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands and multiple 
countries in the South China Sea, the PRC has a growing list of intelligence 
requirements. 
China rapidly developed a number of tactical and MALE unmanned aerial 
vehicles that purportedly feed into a larger C4I architecture. There is no evidence 
to prove that UAV-derived intelligence is making it in any form to Chinese 
policymakers. The indigenously produced BZK-005 UAV has been observed 
operating near the Senkaku Islands and on the tarmac at Chinese bases in the 
Paracel Islands. China’s goals for dominating an informationalized battlefield 
push continued investment and research into more advanced UAVs with 
precision strike capabilities and longer dwell times. 
China exploits the IRMA with a network of sensors, a hierarchical and 
integrated command and control structure, an advanced precision strike 
capability, a maturing situational awareness of the maritime domain, and a 
tendency toward predictive decision-making. This analysis cannot, however, 
conclude that the PRC uses UAVs effectively. Although it has sufficiently  
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exploited the IRMA, China does not appear to have incorporated their unmanned 
technologies into its information architecture. UAVs are not serving as forward 
detection nodes and there is no information to suggest that UAVs are impacting 
the deployment of maritime assets. 
C. SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT 
This chapter explored the use of UAVs by IRMA-exploiting countries in 
order to highlight the impact IRMA exploitation has on effectiveness. UAVs are 
useful platforms for ISR in the maritime domain because they can collect multiple 
categories of information simultaneously over wide areas that offer limited 
alternative means of collection. 
Both the United States and China operate a large number of technically 
capable unmanned platforms. Each state is faced with a number of maritime-
related security challenges but each utilizes its UAV systems differently. China 
and the United States have both exploited the IRMA but it is not apparent that 
both states integrate data from unmanned sensors in the development of 
situational awareness or in predictive decision-making. The effectiveness of the 
UAV platform is contingent on a state’s exploitation of IRMA, but exploitation of 
IRMA does not automatically lead to effective UAV deployment.  
The United States and China appear to understand the value of IRMA 
exploitation and unmanned aircraft, respectively. Accordingly, each has invested 
heavily developing technically capable platforms and the key elements of IRMA. 
The United States’ exploitation of the IRMA and its ability to remotely sense in 
the maritime domain through an array of unmanned assets provides a model of 
UAV effectiveness. It is doubtful that the United States would be effective in its 
use of maritime-specific UAVs if it did not have its impressive intelligence 
processing capability. Conversely, China’s UAV use is in its nascent stages, 
despite exploitation of the IRMA. China does not demonstrate an effective UAV 
deployment capability or any improved maritime domain awareness capabilities. 
While IRMA exploitation is an absolute necessity at the tactical, operational, and 
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strategic levels for UAVs to be effective assets, how UAVs are incorporated into 
the network of sensors and subsequently used affects their value to commanders 




III. MARITIME UAV EMPLOYMENT BY NON-INFORMATION 
RMA-EXPLOITING STATES 
There are many countries that operate UAVs despite not having fully 
exploited the IRMA. According to the Center for a New American Security, “over 
90 countries and non-state groups operate drones today, and even more are 
certain to do so in coming years.”147 While there are a range of factors that drive 
countries to obtain UAVs, their subsequent use and value is contingent on the 
information environment they operate in.  
Iran has a long history with UAV experimentation, demonstrated limited 
exploitation of the IRMA, and expanded its UAV use in the maritime domain over 
the past 20 years.148 More recently, countries including Greece, Brazil, and Italy, 
have begun operating advanced UAVs without having exploited the IRMA. This 
chapter will look at Iran’s program in detail and subsequently make comparisons 
to the programs of several other non-IRMA exploiting countries. 
A. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN 
Iran is engaged in maritime disputes with larger military powers 
immediately adjacent to its territorial waters. Unlike the U.S., China, and 
Australia, three wealthy countries that have the financial and developmental 
means to acquire and field a proficient maritime patrol force, Iran was left after its 
1979 revolution with little more than a few decaying American patrol aircraft. 
Although Iran’s history with developing unmanned aerial vehicles extends back to 
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the early 1980s, Iran’s progress toward developing a proficient UAV capacity 
accelerated in the last 10 years.149 
Iran’s maritime disputes can be categorized as conflicting territorial claims, 
often brought about by the geographic constraints of the region. An overview of 
Iranian forces shows that primary basing of military and paramilitary forces exists 
in the southern regions of the country, primarily defending approaches from the 
sea. Consequently, this is where the majority of Iranian UAVs are based. 
1. Maritime Threats 
Iran is particularly defensive of its territorial seas and airspace. In addition 
to its controversial 1973 straight baseline claim, Iran has disputes over areas in 
the Shatt al-Arab region near its border with Iraq and a long history of conflict in 
the Strait of Hormuz. In 2016, Iran was at the center of an international incident in 
which two U.S. Navy riverine command boats strayed into Iran’s territorial waters 
near Farsi Island and were captured by Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy 
(IRGCN) forces.150 
The constrained waters of the Strait of Hormuz and southern Arabian Gulf 
coupled with Iranian territorial waters around Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, Lesser 
Tunb, and Siri Island force transiting ships to exercise the right of innocent 
passage through Iranian territorial waters and to comply with the internationally 
recognized Transit Separation Scheme.151 Iran frequently monitors naval traffic 
through the Strait of Hormuz and near its claimed baselines. UAVs are one way 
that Iran has attempted to monitor vessels transiting near or through its waters. 
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2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Capability 
Iran’s UAV capabilities have improved significantly since their initial 
fielding. Although the country has operated unmanned aircraft since the early 
1980s, development and employment of new UAV airframes as part of routine 
surveillance operations is relatively new for the Iranian military. 
Iranian drones range from STUAS platforms to MALE airframes. Iranian 
UAVs have been witnessed operating over Syria in support of engaged Iranian 
forces.152 Its maritime UAVs have been observed overflying U.S. Navy warships 
in the Arabian Gulf.153 Iran also exports indigenously produced UAVs to 
countries like Sudan.154  
a. Current Platforms 
Iran is publicly known to have approximately fifteen different variants of 
UAVs based on eleven distinct airframes.155 Most Iranian unmanned platforms 
are designed for ISR but newer platforms like the Shahed 129 show an Iranian 
proclivity to arm unmanned aircraft.156 The oldest platform in the Iranian 
inventory is the Ababil class of UAV. Developed indigenously by HESA in the 
early 1980s, the Ababil comes in short-range, medium-range, and attack variants 
in the Ababil-S, Ababil II, and Ababil-T, respectively.157 The latest version of the 
airframe, called the Ababil III, was released in 2014.158 The newest platform in 
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the Iranian inventory is the Fotros, claimed by Iran to have a 30-hour endurance 
at 25,000 feet.159 The Fotros is displayed in Figure 5. Iran recently announced 
the Hamaseh unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV), which made its unarmed 
debut in 2016 during Iran’s Great Prophet exercises.160 
 
Figure 5.  Iranian Fotros.161 
Two of Iran’s most frequently employed UAVs in the maritime domain are 
the Mohajer class and the Shahed 129 UCAV. The Mohajer class of UAV, like 
the Ababil, saw use in the Iran-Iraq war. The platform’s latest upgrade is the 
Mohajer-4, depicted in Figure 6, commonly used to surveil U.S. Navy vessels 
transiting at sea.162 The Mohajer-4 is a medium-sized, rail launched aircraft 
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that reportedly entered production in late 1997.163 The aircraft has a range 
of approximately 81 nm with an infrared sensor package and possible daytime 
TV camera.164 
 
Figure 6.  Iranian Mohajer-4.165 
The Shahed 129 is most likely a reverse-engineered version of the Israeli 
Hermes 450.166 The Shahed 129 is claimed to have a 1000 nm range with 
24-hour endurance, although this is probably unlikely given the size of 
comparable airframes.167 The Shahed 129 was reported to have flown over the 
USS Harry S. Truman Strike Group on January 12, 2016.168 The aircraft 
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reportedly also conducted air-to-ground strikes in Syria in October, 2015.169 In 
February 2016, the Iranian military redesigned the Shahed 129.170 The new 
version looks similar to the American MQ-9 Reaper with a new dome on the front 
of the airframe that could be housing for a beyond line-of-sight SATCOM 
capability. Both versions are shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7.  Left: Original Iranian Shahed 129; Right: Updated Variant.171 
b. Capital Investment 
Iran’s FY17 defense budget in total amounted to approximately $8.136 
billion.172 This figure covers both the Iranian regular forces as well as the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps paramilitary force. Iran set aside $1.314 
billion for procurement in FY17.173 UAVs fall under Iran’s air forces, both IRIAF 
and IRGCAF. The Iranian Air Force allocated $441 million for procurement, 
although much of that funding is being used for the acquisition of strike and 
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air-to-air capabilities.174 It is unknown how much of the budget is allocated to 
UAV purchases. 
c. UAV Employment 
Iran operates six dedicated drone bases near its southern border.175 
As many of these aircraft are capable of being launched from pneumatic 
launchers or traditional airstrips, the six identified bases are not the only locations 
capable of deploying UAVs. Commercial imagery analyzed by Bard College’s 
Center for the Study of the Drone, included as Figure 8, identified Mohajer, 
Ababil, and Shahed 129 airframes on the tarmac at Qeshm Island, Bandar 
Abbas, Jask,. Minab, Jakigur, and Konarak.176 
 
Figure 8.  Iranian Drone Bases near Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman.177 
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Little is known publicly about Iranian UAV deployments. Iranian UAVs 
have infrequently been observed in the maritime environment operating over 
U.S. Navy vessels, particularly aircraft carriers transiting the Strait of Hormuz. 
Unmanned aircraft have not been reported in other parts of the Arabian Gulf or 
Gulf of Oman.178 Exported versions of Iranian UAVs operated by groups 
including Hezbollah have been shot down in the Levant.179 There is no indication 
that Iranian UAVs used in the maritime environment provide maritime domain 
awareness or cuing capability for military forces, suggesting that Iran does not 
have the information architecture required to use the information they are 
receiving. Instead it is likely that footage from the UAV is obtained by Iranian 
forces upon recovery of the aircraft. This method of imagery retrieval 
substantially increases the amount of time between UAV interception and the 
issuance of a tactical order. It also demonstrates the limited utility of unmanned 
systems when not connected to an information system enhanced by the IRMA. 
3. Exploitation of the Information Revolution in Military Affairs 
a. Sensors 
Iran has an advanced sensor network for the region. It consists of surface 
and air radar sites, aging maritime patrol aircraft, and unmanned aerial 
vehicles.180 Most maritime contacts are directly reported from Iranian naval 
vessels and paramilitary patrol boats. Iran’s capabilities in manned and 
unmanned aircraft are limited both by technology and doctrine. Over the past 
decade, Iran has not improved from IHS Jane’s assessment that Iran has a low 
capability in C4ISR across all warfare domains.181 The limited nature of Iran’s 
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networked sensors reduces its situational awareness, its ability to effectively 
command and control its forces, its capacity to conduct precision strikes based 
on up-to-date intelligence, and ability to predict with any modicum of accuracy 
the effects of its decisions. UAVs capable of transmitting real-time or near-real-
time data back to commanders on the ground could potentially improve the other 
aspects of Iran’s IRMA exploitation. 
b. Command and Control 
Iran’s command and control capability is limited both structurally and 
technologically. Iran adopts a decentralized C2 structure as part of its doctrine.182 
Iran’s observation that adversaries like the U.S. target C2 facilities and structures 
early in combat leads Iran to adopt the decentralized method to increase 
resiliency in combat. Iran also divides its C2 structures between the regular 
Iranian forces and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps leading to distinct 
chains of command. Iran’s inability to easily communicate with its vessels at sea 
is indicative of considerable C2 challenges.  
c. Precision Strike 
Iran has a precision strike capability, particularly in its ballistic missile 
program. It has the capability of accurately striking targets regionally as well 
as in Eastern Europe.183 Iran has coastal defense guided cruise missiles, 
advanced air defense missiles, and ship-launched guided cruise missiles. While 
Iran has an advanced cruise missile capability, it has a limited air-to-ground 
precision strike capacity.  
Although Iranian media sources claim to use UAV-fired PGMs in Syria and 
Iraq, there is no evidence that the weapons employed were in-fact PGMs.184 
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According to IHS Jane’s analysts, the weapons used were purportedly laser-
guided Sadid-1 missiles carried by the Shahed 129. It is difficult to determine if 
the Sadid-1 represents an improvement in precision strike capability for Iran or is 
an exaggeration of its current capabilities. 
d. Situational Awareness 
The Islamic Republic of Iran has the ability to detect air and surface 
targets within its claimed air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and outside of its 
territorial waters. Maintaining an accurate maritime and air picture is substantially 
more difficult than simple detection. UAVs are one way that Iran could improve its 
situational awareness, but only if the data could be delivered quickly to Iranian 
commanders. Observations of IRIN and IRGCN reactions to foreign warship 
transits or presence suggest that tactical units are unaware of vessels that are 
operating in their immediate vicinity. Iran’s challenges in fusing real-time 
coordinates on targets operating in the Arabian Gulf is largely a technological 
issue.185 Direct video feeds from unmanned systems transmitted to command 
centers could alleviate problems that Iran faces with developing situational 
awareness. UAVs are not, however, a universal solution Iran’s poor situational 
awareness. 
e. Predictive Decision-Making 
Iran is largely reactive to world events and perceived threats. Years of 
crippling economic sanctions have shifted Iran’s tactics to more asymmetric 
methods. Since Iran has a lack of dedicated intelligence collection and poor 
situational awareness, it is forced to make decisions based on limited sensors or 
direct visual observation.186 Without an accurate depiction of real events in 
Iranian operational areas and an intentionally decentralized C2, Iran has little 
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hope to control its actions, let alone predict their subsequent outcomes. There is 
no evidence to suggest that Iran makes, or is successful in making, predictions 
about the future implications of its actions. 
4. Conclusion 
Iran’s primary maritime disputes exist in defense of its territorial waters in 
the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. Iran is sensitive to vessels or aircraft, 
particularly warships, that transit close to its claimed territorial waters and 
airspace. Like Southeast Asian states, Iran’s maritime disputes, regardless of 
legality, occur between it and larger powers. Iran’s principal policy goal is to 
defend the sovereignty of its claimed territorial seas and airspace. 
To assist in monitoring its lengthy coastline, Iran employs a number of 
domestically produced unmanned aerial vehicles in the maritime domain. With a 
history of UAV deployment dating back to the early 1980s, Iran has fielded 
increasingly sophisticated platforms like the Mohajer-4 and Shahed 129 to 
monitor activity in the Arabian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Strait of Hormuz.187 Iran is 
developing a number of unmanned platforms for use in combat, with an 
expectation of use in the maritime domain. Iran’s UAV development takes place 
through state-owned enterprises that were financially impacted by international 
sanctions intended to curtail Iran’s nuclear program. Although Iran frequently 
touts its technological superiority, in practice, there is little evidence to suggest 
that the information received from their unmanned sensors cue Iranian military 
assets. Iran’s failure to exploit the IRMA drastically constrains the effectiveness 
of its UAV systems. Time-critical UAV data cannot be received, processed, or 
disseminated with the speed necessary to make timely military decisions. UAVs 
appear to be little more than propaganda to project competency. 
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B. OTHER NON-IRMA EXPLOITING STATES 
With 46% of the world’s countries having an unmanned aerial capability, 
and almost 30 states having an armed drone capacity, UAV systems are 
beginning to see use outside of wealthy countries.188 Whether intended for ISR 
or precision strike, UAV platforms are a more cost-effective solution to traditional 
manned alternatives, especially in the maritime domain. This enables more 
countries to operate UAVs, even if they have not developed the IT infrastructure 
or doctrinal competence to do so effectively. Although UAVs are cheaper to 
acquire than their manned counterparts, it takes a large number of trained 
personnel with access to advanced information systems to operate the platforms 
for ISR or strike missions. Brazil currently operates a total of five MALE 
unmanned aerial vehicles purchased from Israel.189 Italy operates an estimated 
six MQ-9 Reapers.190 Japan is on the verge of operating RQ-4 Global Hawks for 
ISR in east and Southeast Asia.191 Even countries like Greece and Nigeria have 
armed development programs. These are advanced systems that were 
developed in concert with a developed, IRMA-enabled information architecture. 
To return to the analogy, purchasing a SAM system without its radar does not 
translate to an integrated air defense system (IADS). 
 What these countries lack, without exception, are the IRMA-related 
capabilities and exploitation that would optimize their UAV use. Flying a UAV is 
relatively easy. The ability to fly the airframe effectively in the pursuit of ISR or 
strike missions has a much higher barrier to entry. Maintaining the level of 
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analytic support necessary to effectively use data coming from unmanned 
systems is expensive in both physical and human capital. The manpower 
required to process ISR data is a resource that most countries cannot afford. 
Brazil’s military exhibits poor C4ISR capabilities in ground, maritime, and 
other domains.192 It also performs poorly across the board in all indicators of 
IRMA exploitation. Italy and Spain have been slow to integrate modern C4ISR as 
well. Despite having capable UAV platforms, EU border states like Italy and 
Greece are not effectively employing unmanned platforms to find refugees bound 
for European countries. The Syrian and Libyan refugee crises in the 
Mediterranean Sea elucidated the relative inability of UAV-using countries like 
Greece and Italy to integrate UAV-derived information into the intelligence 
resources of organizations like the EU’s Frontex.193 
Japan budgeted approximately $149 million in FY15 for the acquisition of 
the RQ-4 Global Hawk. Long endurance systems are wanted by the Japanese 
Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) and Japanese Air Self-Defense Forces 
(JASDF) to help combat fatigue from maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) crews.194 
While Japan certainly has the IT infrastructure necessary to exploit the IRMA, 
domestic political and social constraints hold it back from embracing the 
revolution.195 Constitutional restrictions on military force for anything other than 
defense complicate Japan’s path to IRMA exploitation. Without IRMA 
exploitation, Japan is going to be limited in how effectively it is able to operate its 
UAVs. Although Japan requires a different path to IRMA exploitation from other 
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countries who utilize it to support offensive operations, its ability to exploit the 
IRMA will bear heavily on whether its investment will have been in vain.196 Until 
Japan solves its domestic challenges to IRMA exploitation, it will be limited both 
in how it employs UAVs like Global Hawk and in the information it hopes to 
incorporate into its decision making processes. 
C. SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT 
This chapter examined UAV adoption from multiple countries that have yet 
to fully exploit the IRMA. Though almost half of the world’s countries now have a 
military UAV capability, the number of countries that can effectively use these 
unmanned platforms in the collection of intelligence or execution of precision 
strikes remains extremely low. Failure to exploit the IRMA is the primary factor 
limiting UAV effectiveness. 
Iran has demonstrated little more with their UAVs than the ability to 
capture footage of vessels at sea. The country does not appear to use UAV 
footage for anything beyond projecting military competence to the Iranian people. 
Failing to exploit the IRMA effectively negates Iran’s capital investment in 
unmanned platforms. 
There are a range of factors, usually political or technological, that prevent 
countries from exploiting the IRMA. Whether countries purchase a UAV system 
from another country or indigenously produce the platform, unmanned aerial 
vehicles are only effectively employed within a larger system that directly 
connects them with decision-makers. 
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IV. PREDICTING SOUTHEAST ASIAN MARITIME UAV 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Proliferation of unmanned systems in Asia is progressing at a blistering 
pace. According to aerospace consultants, the market for UAV technologies in 
Asia is projected to be worth at least $7 billion from 2010–2020.197 Southeast 
Asia’s UAV capability, in particular, is growing at a rapid rate. As described in 
Chapter I, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines have all 
acquired a military UAV capability. Some countries acquired their UAV assets 
commercially while others have focused more heavily on indigenous production. 
Thus far, UAV acquisition in Southeast Asia has been constrained to surveillance 
platforms; however, armed UCAVs may be expected in the near future.198 
Building an unmanned ISR, let alone precision strike capability, without exploiting 
the IRMA calls into question the strategic importance of regional UAV 
proliferation. Is the rise of the drone in Southeast Asia as revolutionary or 
dangerous a development as analysts and pundits have asserted?199 The short 
answer is no. 
There are a range of factors driving the adoption of unmanned 
technologies in Southeast Asia. Scholars including Bitzinger assert that 
Southeast Asian UAV proliferation is symptomatic of regional insecurities and the 
rise of a technologically superior Chinese military.200 While UAVs are part of a 
potential solution to increase regional security, even Bitzinger notes that “except 
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for Singapore, no SEA country has begun to embrace network-centric warfare 
(NCW). Of the rest, only a few possess more than a handful of network or info-
based systems.”201 With a regional military focus on platforms rather than an 
IRMA-enabled information system, the prospects for effective UAV use in 
Southeast Asia are limited.  
This chapter will examine the maritime challenges that Southeast Asian 
countries face and the current state of their maritime UAV capacity. IRMA 
exploitation is critical to the effective employment of UAVs. Because unmanned 
technology is relatively new to the region, evidence of regional UAV employment 
in the maritime domain is extremely limited. This analysis will assess which 
Southeast Asian countries are most likely to effectively deploy unmanned 
systems in the future by examining current IRMA exploitation in terms of the five 
categories of sensors, C2, precision strike, situational awareness, and predictive 
decision-making. Using Emily Goldman’s Diffusion Diagnostic model, this chapter 
will also attempt to identify potential barriers to IRMA exploitation that will 
ultimately constrain the utility of unmanned systems in several Southeast Asian 
countries. 
A. SINGAPORE: THE ONLY SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRY LIKELY TO 
USE UAVS EFFECTIVELY 
Singapore is the only Southeast Asian country likely to be effective in its 
employment of UAVs, particularly in the maritime domain, because of its 
exploitation of the IRMA. The country’s strong IT capabilities and doctrinal 
reliance on technology gives it an advantage in the effective deployment of an 
increasing number of unmanned platforms. Singapore utilizes its IKC2 
architecture to feed sensor data into its Information Fusion Centre (IFC), 
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synthesizing data access and C2.202 Singapore’s exploitation of the IRMA makes 
effective UAV employment for ISR highly probable in the future. 
1. Maritime Challenges 
 Singapore has relatively few maritime challenges compared to its 
neighbors. The country has no controversial claims in the South China Sea and 
has positive bilateral relationships with its neighbors. The only recent notable 
maritime dispute involving Singapore occurred between Malaysia and Singapore 
over a series of maritime features east of the Singapore Strait. Competing claims 
to Pedra Branca, the Middle Rocks, and the South Ledge were resolved by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2008.203 The court ruled that Pedra Branca 
and the Middle Rocks belonged to Singapore and Malaysia, respectively.204 The 
South Ledge was determined to be a low-tide elevation not subject to territorial 
claim. There is no evidence that Singapore utilized unmanned systems for any 
purpose during the dispute, though they could have been useful in identifying a 
Malaysian presence near the disputed areas. 
There are a number of transnational challenges that Singapore faces 
because of its geographic location. From 1995-2013, 65% of worldwide piracy 
incidents were reported in Southeast Asia.205 Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia developed the MALSINDO Coordinated Patrol (MCP) in concert with 
the Eyes-in-the-Sky (EIS) program to provide combined security patrols in and 
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over the Strait of Malacca.206 The EIS program provided combined and 
coordinated ISR to help increase maritime domain awareness and reduce piracy. 
Information obtained during flights was combined with surface reporting at the 
IFC in Singapore.207 Unmanned aerial vehicles were not used specifically for the 
EIS program but could have easily replaced manned maritime patrol aircraft. The 
EIS and the IFC demonstrated that fusing sensor intelligence to create near-
complete situational awareness for deployed units can improve efficiency in the 
use of force. Piracy attempts in the Strait of Malacca have drastically reduced 
and moved primarily to the stationary maritime traffic in the Singapore Strait, 
where commercial vessels are easy targets. Having an effective unmanned ISR 
capability could be particularly useful in identifying potential pirates or responding 
to hijackings in the Strait. 
2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Capability 
Singapore’s military possesses around 100 UAVs in a variety of 
configurations ranging from tactical to MALE platforms.208 It has a long 
commercial relationship with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). Singapore’s first 
military acquisition was in the 1980s with IAI’s Scout and Searcher tactical 
UAVs.209 More recently, the Singapore Air Force (SAF) purchased IAI’s Heron 
and Hermes MALE UAVs which increase its surveillance capabilities in day or 
night conditions.210 Singapore’s Navy began operating the Insitu ScanEagle from 
its corvettes at sea in 2002.211 The navy demonstrated its capabilities during the 
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2015 Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) exercise with the 
United States.212 Singapore has not expressed any desire to obtain an armed 
UAV capability, and is not engaged in missions that require it. 
In addition to its daytime and infrared imaging capabilities, Singapore’s 
UAVs enable the country to conduct communications intelligence (COMINT), 
electronic intelligence (ELINT), communications relay and jamming missions.213 
The UAVs provide a range of advanced ISR capabilities without the need to 
acquire additional, or improve current, manned ISR platforms. Overall, Singapore 
has a suitable UAV force for its security needs. Tactical and MALE platforms 
combined with the ability to launch airframes at sea give Singapore a formidable 
maritime ISR capability.  
3. Exploitation of the Information Revolution in Military Affairs 
Singapore is the one country in Southeast Asia that has clearly exploited 
almost all aspects of the IRMA. Despite its size, the country has developed a 
networked sensor and C2 capability, has a precision strike capacity, and fuses 
information to develop advanced situational awareness in a notoriously 
congested maritime transit corridor. Though little is known publicly about how 
Singapore’s military officials make decisions, doctrinal writings show a proclivity 
for informed mission command at the lowest level possible.214 A focus on war-
gaming further reflects the Singaporean military’s preference for accurate 
prediction of a decision’s potential implications. 
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a. Sensors 
Due of a lack of strategic depth, Singapore relies heavily on 
advancements in sensor technology to ensure a prudent military response. 
Ground-based surveillance radars and airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft 
sense air contacts while coastal sites receive data from satellites, “shore-based 
military and civilian radars, ships at sea, maritime patrol aircraft, and shore-based 
electronic and signals intelligence.”215 UAVs are a critical sensor for land and 
maritime reconnaissance, search and rescue, and target acquisition and 
tracking.216 Data from these sensors feed back into processing facilities that fuse 
it with information from other sensors. 
b. Command and Control 
As early as 1991, Singapore’s Ministry of Defense (MINDEF) sought 
proposals for an all-encompassing C4I network including resilient 
communications paths between shore sites, ships, and aircraft.217 Singapore’s 
armed forces now have a networked command and control capability that 
includes multiple communications paths including satellite. Singapore co-locates 
its C2 capabilities with intelligence fusion cells at its Changi Command and 
Control Centre. The C2 organization is home to the Singapore Maritime Security 
Centre (SMSC), IFC, and Multinational Operations and Exercises Centre 
(MOEC).218 This structure enables informed decision making for military 
commanders. 
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c. Precision Strike 
Although Singapore has not expanded its precision strike capabilities to 
include unmanned aircraft, it does have PGMs in the air and maritime domains. 
With its advanced air and surface platforms, Singapore can strike targets with 
laser guided munitions like the AGM-65 Maverick, AGM-84 Harpoon, and AGM-
114 Hellfire.219 Singapore also has advanced air-to-air and cruise missiles.220 
d. Situational Awareness 
Singapore’s establishment of the Information Fusion Centre in 2009 vastly 
expanded its maritime domain awareness capabilities. According to the head 
of the IFC, the organization’s aim is to “ensure that actionable information can 
be delivered to regional partners for further collaboration or to cue timely 
operational responses.”221 The IFC utilizes a combined information system called 
Open and Analysed Shipping Information System (OASIS) and its Sense-
Making, Analysis and Research Tool (SMART) in its fusion of data from 
commercial sources like AIS, international partners, national sensors, and the 
shipping community. These tools and data sources generate a common view of 
the maritime environment immediately surrounding Singapore.222 Singapore’s 
IFC is considered by regional experts to be the most mature MDA capability in 
Southeast Asia.223 
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e. Predictive Decision Making 
With a technologically advanced sensor, C2, and MDA capability, 
Singapore can make informed decisions based on real-time data. Without explicit 
examples of armed force responses to real-world problems, it is impossible to 
ascertain whether Singapore considers the implications of its decisions ahead of 
time; however, its doctrinal focus on generating actionable intelligence make 
informed decision-making a probability. 
4. Conclusion 
 Singapore continues to expand its unmanned ISR capabilities by 
acquiring technically sophisticated platforms. Land-based Hermes and Heron 
MALE UAVs and sea-based ScanEagle tactical UAVs provide Singapore with 
one of the most advanced regional unmanned orders of battle. Singaporean UAV 
operations have not been observed in sufficient numbers to gauge if they are 
being effectively employed. 
Singapore’s thorough exploitation of the IRMA makes future effective UAV 
employment far more likely. The country’s ability to fuse data from a variety of 
sensors to achieve a synthesized picture of the operational environment in the 
same building as its principal C2 functions is likely to lead to informed and 
predictive decision-making. Together with the capacity to deliver PGMs from 
modern platforms that have secure, redundant communications with 
commanders, Singapore has demonstrated the force-multiplying characteristics 
of an informationalized military. With timely access to information in the maritime 
domain, Singapore’s armed forces are likely to effectively deploy their unmanned 
assets in a way that enhance its combat capabilities. 
B. SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES UNLIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE UAV 
USERS 
According to analysis from McKinsey & Company, Southeast Asia is 
poised for tremendous military growth, especially in modernizing technologies 
like UAVs. A report from the company states that “Southeast Asia…is among the 
 75
top defense spenders globally,” with budgets doubling over the past decade.224 
Drone manufacturers from Israel to Belarus are all hoping to capture a share of 
Southeast Asia’s military procurement money. Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and 
the Philippines all have nascent UAV capabilities in various forms. While there is 
substantial regional interest in obtaining an unmanned capability, most Southeast 
Asian countries have focused heavily on indigenous development rather than 
commercial acquisition. These countries have only managed to reach the initial 
stages of UAV development and have not focused on exploiting the IRMA to 
make their future platforms more effective. 
Southeast Asia has a variety of maritime challenges that could benefit 
from effective UAV use. In addition to ongoing maritime disputes in the South 
China Sea, UAVs could assist in humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) 
operations, piracy, terrorism, and drug trafficking. UAVs could drastically improve 
Southeast Asian countries’ ISR for a variety of missions, but only if the 
infrastructure exists to support them. This section focuses on Malaysian, 
Indonesian, Vietnamese, and Filipino efforts to acquire UAVs, how they have 
exploited the IRMA, and what factors may hold them back from effective UAV 
employment. 
1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Capability 
Outside of Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia have the most sophisticated 
UAVs. This is due in large part to their development or commercial acquisition of 
MALE platforms from Belarus and IAI, respectively.  
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a. Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
Vietnam has previously purchased Belarussian and Israeli tactical 
UAVs.225 Vietnam’s latest UAV is the indigenously produced the HS-6L MALE 
platform, although analysts claim that the aircraft was developed jointly with 
Belarus.226 The airframe is still a prototype. In addition to the HS-6L, Vietnamese 
drone manufacturer Viettel’s Patrol VT tactical UAV was reportedly delivered to 
the military in 2013. Neither the HS-6L nor the Patrol VT have been observed in 
an operational capacity. Beyond technical difficulties, there are political and legal 
reasons that Vietnam has not yet deployed its unmanned aircraft. According to 
analysts at the Center for a New American Security, “There are extensive 
debates in Vietnam about how to use UAVs for national defense purposes, and 
the general sense is that UAVs can be legitimately used for protecting 
independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.”227 With UAVs being a new 
issue for the Vietnamese government, UAVs are likely to only be deployed in the 
near future for national defense rather than maritime ISR.228 
b. Malaysia 
Malaysia has indigenously developed a number of tactical and MALE 
UAVs for ISR.229 The Aludra Mk 1 and Aludra Mk 2 MALE platforms very closely 
resemble the IAI Heron UAV. Additionally, Malaysia has reportedly leased the 
Insitu ScanEagle tactical UAV from the United States.230 In 2014, the Malaysian 
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Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) announced that it planned to utilize UAVs 
to identify maritime territorial incursions although there is no evidence to suggest 
this took place.231  
c. Republic of Indonesia 
Indonesia’s most capable platform was acquired commercially. The 
military obtained and now operates an IAI Heron II MALE UAV.232 The Israeli-
produced Heron is far superior, technically, to the indigenously developed Crow, 
Woodpecker, and Wulung tactical platforms. Indonesia’s military industry is 
experiencing technical difficulties in producing UAVs that are capable of long 
duration missions. Although Indonesia had experimented with unmanned 
platforms as early as 2003, it was not until the presidency of Joko Widodo that 
interest in UAV acquisition for border and EEZ monitoring began.233 Most of the 
UAV platforms in use with the Indonesian military are DJI’s commercially-
available S800 EVO platform, designed for cinematographers.234 Indonesia 
originally used UAVs only for domestic surveillance and disaster response.235 
From a military perspective, Indonesia financed new drone projects that were 
intended for use as kamikaze-style weapons against vessels operating illegally in 
Indonesian waters.236 Despite the newfound interest, Indonesia still faces 
political and financial obstacles to developing an advanced UAV capability. 
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d. Republic of the Philippines 
There is extremely limited information available about Filipino UAV 
acquisition and use. In late 2013, the Philippine Army claimed to have utilized 
indigenously produced Raptor and Knight Falcon tactical UAVs during operations 
against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).237 There are reportedly two 
General Atomics Predator A airframes that are registered with the national 
security advisor, presumably for ISR against southern insurgents.238 Reportedly, 
the use of UAVs, particularly UCAVs, is domestically controversial following a 
2012 incident in which a U.S.–operated Predator conducted a precision strike 
against the Abu Sayyaf Group.239 This marked the first time a UAV had 
conducted a strike operation in Southeast Asia. 
2. Exploitation of the Information Revolution in Military Affairs 
With Singapore a notable exception, most Southeast Asian countries have 
only partially exploited the IRMA. Even in these cases, partial exploitation 
occurred out of either a singular necessity or as a consequence of military 
modernization. Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines have not 
demonstrated a concerted effort to embrace the IRMA. U.S. capital investment 
and advice under its 2015 Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) aims to expedite the 
regional exploitation of IRMA. In December 2015, the United States announced 
that it would be committing more than $250 million in assistance over two years 
to develop maritime security in Southeast Asia.240 That figure grew to $425 
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million over five years.241 The MSI is designed to “enhance ‘sensing’ of allies and 
partners in the South China Sea; technical ‘supporting infrastructure’ would 
facilitate ‘sharing’ maritime information across the region to build a COP.”242  
Failing to exploit the IRMA will have a negative impact on the effectiveness of 
future UAV deployment and makes further unmanned acquisitions efforts an 
imprudent investment. 
a. Sensors 
All countries in Southeast Asia have some type of sensor capability 
in the maritime domain.243 The Philippines has received extensive support from 
the United States to develop its sensor network. The sensor side of the 
Philippines’ Coast Watch System (CWS) is comprised of networked coastal radar 
stations that provide a purported 96 nautical mile visibility.244 Additionally, the 
Philippines is receiving an aerostat surveillance balloon from the U.S. with long-
range radar detection capabilities as well as U.S.-funded improvements to 
existing manned ISR aircraft.245 In December 2015, Malaysia upgraded its 
coastal ISR by ordering six new surveillance radars from Airbus.246 All Southeast 
Asian countries receive data from maritime air and surface patrollers. The United 
States Navy is sending a team of UAV experts to Vietnam to “brief Vietnamese 
leaders ‘on the concept of using different systems and create an opportunity for 
Vietnamese officials to visit a U.S. military unit with operational UAS assets,’ in 
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the hopes that Vietnam may find a system that would be useful for boosting its 
maritime domain awareness.”247 
b. Command and Control 
Southeast Asian countries suffer from a number of C2 challenges ranging 
from highly centralized or politicized forces to a technological inability to 
effectively execute command. Due to the expensive price tag, most Southeast 
Asian militaries are in the preliminary stages of developing a net-centric C2 
capability. Malaysia and Vietnam are examples of countries that are still 
developing the networks necessary for efficient command and control. Malaysia 
is currently modernizing its strategic and operational C4I network.248 The 
country’s 2015 C4I pilot ultimately provided a limited C2 capability.249 MSI 
specifically addresses Malaysia’s deficiencies in secure communications.250 
Vietnam has similar challenges in the development of its C4I network and also 
struggles with commanding joint forces.251 The Philippines is receiving a secure 
communications system under MSI.252 An inability to demonstrate unity of 
command over joint forces makes effective UAV employment difficult if, for 
example, air force assets are deployed in the maritime domain. 
c. Precision Strike 
Precision strike is the easiest of the IRMA categories to exploit because it 
can be commercially acquired. The identification and tracking of a target is 
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considerably more difficult than the employment of a PGM against it. Vietnam 
and Indonesia have a highly advanced surface and coastal defense cruise 
missile capability in the Russian-exported SS-N-26 Yakhont.253 Malaysia 
employs U.S.-supplied Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) from its F/A-18 
Hornet aircraft. The Philippines is the only country of the group that has a limited 
precision strike capability. Filipino limitations are due largely to its aging tactical 
platforms. No Southeast Asian country has an armed drone capability. 
d. Situational Awareness 
Regional situational awareness is generally poor, but improving with 
external assistance under the MSI. The U.S. “will outfit Malaysia with $1.2 million 
in secure communications and an expanded Malaysia Armed Forces (MAF) 
common operating picture to connect the Royal Malaysian Flight Operations 
Center, Operational Forces, and MAF headquarters.”254 U.S. Pacific Command 
is providing Indonesia with the Field Information Support Tool to enable “greater 
interoperability, integrated data correlation, and analysis for a shared common 
operational picture.”255 The Philippines built, with financial assistance and 
guidance from the United States and Australia, their Coast Watch System in 
2015. The CWS fuses data from multiple sources to form a common operational 
picture of the waters immediately surrounding the Philippine islands.256 UAVs 
could feed a wealth of data into these regional COPs if they are connected to and 
tasked through the region’s new networks. 
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e. Predictive Decision-Making 
Military operations for Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines 
are usually reactive. Unfortunately, without more detailed information about 
military operations, it is impossible to ascertain if commanders were making 
informed decisions or accurately predicting the outcomes of their commands. 
The MALSINDO patrols and EIS program could be used as a positive example of 
predictive decision-making for Indonesia and Malaysia. By deploying ISR and 
surface assets to the Strait of Malacca, the countries accurately predicted that 
piracy activity would either cease or relocate. For most countries, a lack of 
sensor data and situational awareness make the accurate prediction of any 
decision’s implication remote. As countries begin to exploit the IRMA in more 
detail, tactical changes in Southeast Asian military responses to incidents or 
crises may provide greater clarity on the topic.  
f. Conclusion 
Most countries in Southeast Asia lag behind other regional actors in 
exploiting the IRMA. Despite regional interest in acquiring a UAV capability, the 
lack of C4I infrastructure and data fusion capabilities will render UAVs ineffective 
for military applications, especially in the maritime domain. A general lack of 
sensors, inefficient command structures, poor C4I infrastructure, and a lack of 
situational awareness disadvantage Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines in the effective deployment of military assets to include UAVs. 
The dramatic increase in capital and expertise invested by the U.S. 
under the 2015 MSI is likely to significantly change how Southeast Asian 
countries approach maritime domain awareness, net-centric warfare, and UAV 
employment. Southeast Asian military leaders will be required to shift doctrine in 
order to embrace IRMA exploitation and receive the revolution’s advantages in 
the long term. 
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3. Obstacles to IRMA Exploitation in Southeast Asia 
Although countries like the United States, Australia, and Singapore are 
encouraging the spread of IRMA throughout Southeast Asia, there are factors 
that prevent the revolution’s regional diffusion. Using Emily Goldman’s Diffusion 
Diagnostic model for an analytic framework, this section will highlight the 
obstacles that slow Vietnamese, Malaysian, Indonesian, and the Filipino 
progress toward IRMA exploitation. Correcting these constraints to innovation 
could speed the diffusion of IRMA and provide the necessary infrastructure to 
effectively deploy UAVs. 
a. Polity 
The biggest political constraint to IRMA diffusion in Southeast Asia is 
the security focus of the military. Countries that have an inward security focus 
in order to ensure regime security tend to resist significant changes to 
military command and control. Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines should 
refocus military attention on external security challenges in order to foster 
competitiveness between services vying for increased unit effectiveness. 
Maritime disputes with China are catalyzing the shift in regional focus from 
internal to external security. 
b. Economy 
The IRMA is heavily influenced by technological development in a range 
of military sectors. One of Southeast Asia’s main obstacles to exploiting aspects 
of the IRMA is the cost associated with modernization. Southeast Asian 
governments should facilitate economic growth; encourage market liberalization, 
and expand indigenous research and development to meet their specific security 
needs. Foreign direct investment like MSI in the defense sector could enable 
further IRMA exploitation and advanced UAV development in countries like 
Malaysia and the Philippines, but only in the short-term. Acquiring advanced UAV 
systems from countries like Israel, China, and the United States help the 
exploitation of IRMA components like sensors and precision strike in the 
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short-term. Acquisition will reduce the long-term need for innovation and 
continued IRMA exploitation if countries fail to use acquired technology to inspire 
domestic UAV design and innovation. Reverse engineering acquired platforms 
will constrain innovation and minimize the economic value of the domestic 
defense industry. 
c. Society and Culture 
Characteristics of Southeast Asian society and culture prove that the 
region is fertile ground for innovative ideas like the IRMA. Southeast Asia has 
high levels of technical education, which are viewed as a key enabler of the 
IRMA. According to 2015 data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development, Southeast Asian countries were ranked highly for math and 
science at age 15.257 Vietnam ranked 12th and Malaysia ranked 52nd while 
Singapore topped the global rankings.258 Indonesia and the Philippines 
experience the highest social challenges to IRMA exploitation. The countries 
should focus on technical education and literacy to create a workforce that has 
the skills necessary to work in IRMA related fields. 
d. Military Organizations 
Politicization of the military, low levels of service interconnectedness, and 
asymmetry in power between the military branches are the principal military 
obstacles to exploiting the IRMA in Southeast Asia. Vietnam and Indonesia have 
highly politicized militaries with asymmetric power balances between branches. 
Indonesia’s army is dominant in size, political influence, and power.259 Vietnam’s 
branches subordinate through its army, automatically elevating the power and 
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prestige of the organization over its air and naval components.260 Malaysia is 
known to have low levels of interconnectedness between its joint services, an 
issue it has been trying to rectify since 2007.261 All of these countries have to 
learn to work jointly in an interconnected manner to be effective in their 
respective IRMA exploitation, deployment of UAVs, and cuing of air, surface, or 
land assets. 
C. SUMMARY AND ASSESSMENT 
This chapter examined the current state of UAV adoption and IRMA 
exploitation in Southeast Asia. With the exception of Singapore, most countries 
have a keen interest in obtaining a UAV capability but have not exploited the 
IRMA. UAV use in Southeast Asia is in its infancy, but set to mature in the near 
future. With a particular set of maritime challenges, Southeast Asian militaries 
would greatly benefit from the effective use of UAVs in the maritime domain. 
Singapore has exploited the IRMA in every category. Its advanced 
network of sensors, C2, situational awareness, precision strike, and predictive-
decision making capabilities give it a considerable advantage over any 
other regional military. As Singapore begins to build a larger and more 
capable UAV force, it will experience minimal challenges to the platforms’ 
effective employment.  
Other countries in Southeast Asia like Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
the Philippines have not exploited the IRMA to date and are therefore unlikely to 
deploy UAVs effectively in the near future. The countries are developing 
unmanned capabilities, though at a much slower pace compared to Singapore. 
ISR data from the unmanned aircraft are not supported by an IT infrastructure 
that enables analysis and delivery to policy-makers. The substantial human and 
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capital investments made by the U.S. in its 2015-2020 Maritime Security Initiative 
support regional ISR and MDA development. The effort has a good probability of 
pushing Southeast Asian countries into IRMA exploitation. If Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, or the Philippines exploit the IRMA, they stand a good chance of 
effectively utilizing their unmanned platforms to enable efficient regional military 
operations. There are, however, several constraining factors in the political, 
economic, social, and military sectors that could cause IRMA exploitation to 
languish, along with their unmanned assets. 
Exploitation of the IRMA is a necessary precondition to effectively deploy 
UAVs, but its exploitation does not ensure effective UAV use. Effective 
deployment of UAVs in the tactical environment requires operators, analysts, and 
decision-makers to work in concert to provide information advantage to a military 
force. UAVs provide little utility to a commander when employed outside of the 
information ecosystem. 
Although much has been made of the UAV’s prospects to change the 
balance of power in the South China Sea, and by extension Asia, such an 
assertion is currently hyperbolic. The more complex the unmanned system, the 
more mature the support must be to effectively deploy it. If a country truly wants 












The unmanned aerial vehicle is a powerful ISR tool, especially in the 
maritime domain where there are few alternative sources of intelligence. UAVs 
can meet a range of ISR needs in a more timely and cost-efficient manner than 
the training, maintenance, and development required to field a manned airborne 
reconnaissance capability. The effectiveness of UAVs is not, however, 
predetermined at acquisition. There is an extensive support network that has to 
be in place for UAVs to be of value to military forces. UAVs serve as an effective 
component of the larger information architecture available to countries that have 
exploited the IRMA. Most contemporary analysis on drone proliferation 
incorrectly focuses on the drone platforms themselves, rather than their role in a 
larger system.262 Little attention is paid by analysts to the sensors, C2, precision 
strike, situational awareness, and predictive decision-making capabilities of UAV-
operating militaries. Although regions like Southeast Asia are rapidly acquiring 
unmanned aircraft, the proliferation of UAV technology, especially in Southeast 
Asia, is not nearly as revolutionary or dangerous as it seems. 
Chapter I explained that revolutions in military affairs are fundamental 
shifts in the nature or conduct of warfare. The Napoleonic and nuclear 
revolutions are examples of how the use of technology, rather than the 
technology itself, can prove to be revolutionary in combat. The most recent RMA 
is the information RMA. The IRMA is comprised of five categories: sensors, C2, 
precision strike, near-complete situational awareness, and an actor’s ability to 
accurately predict a decision’s implications. UAV adoption in Southeast Asia is 
on the rise, with Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines all 
acquiring unmanned ISR platforms but most have failed to exploit the IRMA. 
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The United States and China are UAV-using countries that have exploited 
the IRMA. The U.S. uses its UAV systems effectively, especially in the maritime 
domain, to feed data into a larger architecture that helps accelerate the military 
decision-making process. The U.S. deploys UAVs in ways that enhance other 
aspects of the IRMA. China has advanced UAVs, but fails to utilize them 
effectively. China has, to some degree, exploited all subcategories of the IRMA 
but does not appear to use UAVs regularly or to cue military forces. This chapter 
exhibits that effective UAV use is contingent on both IRMA exploitation and the 
incorporation of UAVs into a larger informationalized doctrine. 
Iran and other countries have only partially exploited the IRMA. Despite 
Iran’s long history with drone operation, its lack of IRMA exploitation restricts the 
sharing of UAV-derived information in a timely fashion. As a result, Iran’s forces 
are forced to adopt a reactionary military strategy normally reserved for much 
smaller forces. Countries like Brazil and Greece have significant political 
obstacles to exploiting the IRMA and ineffectively deploy UAV assets. Japan 
faces legal and cultural challenges to developing the information ecosystem 
necessary to effectively deploy the highly-advanced UAVs it invested in. 
Southeast Asia is rapidly acquiring UAV systems; however, most countries 
have not exploited the IRMA and are unlikely to use their systems effectively. 
Singapore is the only country that has exploited the IRMA. Singapore’s forces 
have a variety of advanced tactical and MALE unmanned ISR aircraft and 
the information architecture to support them. Conversely, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines are focusing more heavily on acquiring or 
indigenously developing UAV systems rather than working to exploit aspects of 
the IRMA. Even if the four countries were to use their UAVs, they would have 
limited information on where and how to deploy them, experience difficulty in 
transmitting and analyzing the UAV-derived information, and would be incapable 
of efficiently exercising force to respond to UAV-detected threats. The United 
States is attempting to rectify Southeast Asia’s IRMA-related shortcomings by 
investing a considerable amount of human and physical capital. The injection of 
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resources and expertise could be the catalyst that Southeast Asian countries 
need to effectively utilize their UAV systems and fundamentally change how 
force is used throughout the region. 
A. ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
At the outset of this research, three possibilities were proposed to explain 
the relationship between IRMA exploitation and UAV effectiveness: one, that 
extensive exploitation is required to use UAVs effectively; two, that only partial 
exploitation was required for effective UAV use; and three, that UAVs are 
effective platforms regardless of IRMA exploitation.  
1. Analysis of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis one provides the most plausible depiction of the relationship 
between effective UAV employment and IRMA exploitation. Full IRMA 
exploitation ensures that information derived from the unmanned platform has 
the requisite architecture to be delivered to a decision-maker. The decision-
maker needs to have the situational awareness and capacity to deliver informed 
commands to units capable of delivering predictable effects. By analyzing UAV 
capabilities and use by the United States, China, Iran, and other UAV-adopting 
countries, one can see that only the United States uses UAVs in an effective 
way.  
The U.S. military’s exploitation of the IRMA is what makes its UAV use a 
tactical, operational, and strategic advantage. The U.S. has advanced UAV 
capabilities that are supported by a network of alternative sensors, a connected 
C2 doctrine and system, informed situational awareness, and advanced precision 
strike capability delivered with a pre-determined understanding of its effects. All 
aspects of the IRMA work in concert and in a cyclical nature. UAV-derived 
information before, during, and after a strike can determine the continuing 
intelligence needs of the commander and ultimately impact future UAV use.  
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Partial exploitation of the IRMA, established in hypothesis two, is unlikely 
to enable effective UAV deployment. Failing to exploit any of the IRMA’s 
components eliminates a force’s ability to efficiently use information in the 
application of force. Removing any IRMA capability from an informationalized 
military affects the force’s other capabilities. In a scenario where intelligence 
derived solely from a UAV is delivered to a C2-capable decision-maker, a lack of 
situational awareness would destroy any possibility of accurate prediction 
pertaining to potential decisions. A UAV is an information asset that is completely 
reliant on the functionality of the larger information system. 
China’s UAV technology is rapidly approaching parity with that of the 
United States but it has not been operationally effective, especially in the 
maritime domain. China has partially exploited the IRMA in sensors and precision 
strike, however, the country’s C2 and situational awareness capabilities are still 
being improved. China’s overall goal of developing an informationalized military 
is rapidly progressing. Once China achieves this goal, UAVs can be deployed 
more effectively. 
This analysis found that in order to make complete use of the information 
that UAVs obtain, countries have to exploit all facets of the IRMA. Militaries that 
fail to fully exploit the IRMA are unable to process all UAV-derived information 
and therefore are incapable of using it to make timely, well-informed decisions. 
Actionable intelligence tends to have a short lifespan. A military’s ability to quickly 
deliver battlefield intelligence to a commander is critical to the concept of net-
centric warfare. 
It is an important distinction that while IRMA exploitation is a necessary 
precondition for effective UAV use, IRMA exploitation does not guarantee that 
UAVs will be deployed effectively. Countries can ineffectively deploy UAVs, fail to 
correctly analyze UAV-derived information, or fail to deliver the information to 
commanders in an efficient manner. IRMA is a requirement for effective UAV 
employment, but IRMA-enabled UAVs may not necessarily be used effectively. 
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2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Southeast Asia 
Southeast Asia is an emerging market for UAVs. Although many countries 
in Southeast Asia are acquiring relatively advanced unmanned platforms, the 
lack of regional IRMA exploitation will continue to restrict UAV effectiveness. 
Singapore is the only Southeast Asian country to exploit the IRMA. Although 
Singapore has not been observed deploying UAVs in large quantities, they have 
the prerequisite IRMA exploitation to effectively do so. Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines are in the early stages of partial IRMA exploitation. 
Despite its potential as a low-cost asymmetric alternative to advanced 
Chinese MPA, actionable UAV-derived intelligence is beyond the grasp of 
most Southeast Asian countries. Political, economic, cultural, and military 
obstacles to regional IRMA diffusion currently exist; however, the 2015–2020 
United States Maritime Security Initiative has the potential to jumpstart IRMA 
exploitation. Southeast Asian exploitation of the IRMA and effective UAV 
deployment in the South China Sea has the potential to increase the military 
capacity of Southeast Asian states and affect their respective maritime disputes. 
The proliferation of UAV technology in Southeast Asia is not nearly as 
revolutionary or dangerous as it seems. 
3. Implications of Research Findings 
Future analysis on military drone acquisition and use should focus more 
broadly on IRMA exploitation and the information ecosystems of drone users. 
While there are considerable advantages to operating UAV platforms, the 
support structure that makes them effective is anything but unmanned. Effective 
UAV operations are expensive in both physical and human capital. Doctrine also 
does not evolve overnight. Assessing a country’s military capability by measuring 
their unmanned platforms in quantity or quality is an inaccurate way to gauge 
military capability.  
Countries that are seeking to utilize modern technologies like UAVs need 
to invest heavily in exploiting the IRMA to provide the infrastructure necessary for 
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UAVs to operate effectively. Additionally, the relationship between IRMA 
exploitation and UAV effectiveness requires countries like the U.S. to adopt a 
different model of military aid to countries seeking an information advantage. 
Supplying unmanned platforms through foreign military sales, as China does, is 
unlikely to significantly affect the status quo on the battlefield. If the U.S. is truly 
seeking to improve the capabilities of its allies, it must make simultaneous 
investments in all deficient aspects of a country’s IRMA exploitation. An 
informationalized force is far more likely to make well-informed military decisions, 
effectively use unmanned assets, and ideally reduce conflict. IRMA exploitation 
and effective UAV use are a potent force multiplier for an informationalized 
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